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INTRODUCTION
We have now completed the first full term of the Roberts Court. During
this term the Court issued its first major Establishment Clause decision in Hein
v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.' In this case the Court restricted-
although it did not eliminate altogether-the ability of plaintiffs to use their
taxpayer status to obtain standing in federal court to challenge government fi-
nancing of religious activity. Specifically, the Court refused to grant standing to
taxpayer plaintiffs challenging executive branch decisions to fund religious ac-
tivities. Thus, the Court chipped away at its traditional willingness to recognize
the often highly-amorphous injuries of Establishment Clause plaintiffs and be-
gan integrating Establishment Clause challenges into the far more restrictive
rules that have governed standing in federal court since Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.2 Hein may be the harbinger of further restrictions on standing in other
127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
2 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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types of Establishment Clause cases, such as cases involving government en-
dorsement of sectarian religious principles and symbols.3 We could be on the
brink, in other words, of a substantial contraction in the number and nature of
Establishment Clause claims that may be brought before the federal courts. In
the absence of a plaintiff who has a very specific, tort-style injury-such as a
child who is forced to pray in a public school classroom or a prisoner who is
forced to engage in religious activity to obtain early-release credits-systematic
Establishment Clause violations may effectively get lumped together with
claims under the Statement and Account Clause as de facto political questions.4
The possibility that the Court will impose significant new procedural
limits on those seeking to bring Establishment Clause claims in federal court is
not, however, the greatest cause for concern for the dwindling number of self-
identified academic and judicial separationists. The greater concern for latter-
day Madisonians and Jeffersonians is the far more ominous prospect that the
new majority on the Supreme Court is about to embark on a wholesale reinter-
pretation of the entire constitutional approach toward the relationship between
church and state. This new approach would abandon any pretense of
church/state separation, in favor of an approach favoring some measure of inte-
gration of church and state.
There are many indications that the newly reconfigured Court is likely
to take this step. Two longstanding members of the Court-Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas-have already described in detail their version of church/state
integration.5 Prior to their elevation to the Supreme Court, the two newest
members of the Court--Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito-also wrote
favorably of this new approach.6 As usual, in recent analyses of these and other
3 See Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that "Psychic Injuries"-that is,
injuries deriving from mental distress incurred because of exposure to constitutional violations-
are insufficient to establish standing under Article III). This approach to the Article III case or
controversy requirement would virtually eliminate standing to challenge government violations of
the Establishment Clause in the absence of highly individualized religious coercion, which almost
never occurs outside the public school context.
4 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (denying standing to challenge
congressional violation of Statement and Account Clause, and analogizing the claim to a political
question: "In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of
Congress, and ultimately to the political process.").
5 See, e.g., Justice Scalia's assertion (in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas) that
the country's political structure should reflect the religious views of the culture's monotheistic
majority. See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., John G. Roberts, Memorandum for Fred F. Fielding, May 6, 1985, at 2, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/roberts/Box48-JGR-SchoolPrayerl.
pdf (last visited June 19, 2007) (in a memorandum written by Chief Justice Roberts while serving
in President Reagan's Office of White House Counsel, Roberts praised then-Justice Rehnquist's
attempt to "revolutionize" Establishment Clause jurisprudence by adopting the theory that the
government may engage in the nonsectarian endorsement of religion); Samuel Alito, Non-Career
Appointment Form, Nov. 15, 1985, at 3, available at http://www.law.com/pdf/dc/alitoDOJ.pdf
(last visited June 19, 2007) (on an application for a job as deputy assistant attorney general for the
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constitutional matters, the wild card is Justice Kennedy. Except in cases involv-
ing the religious coercion of public school children, in which he recoils from the
logical implications of this new integrationist regime, Justice Kennedy votes
consistently with the Court's new anti-separationist majority. At times, he has
even added his own voice to the integrationist mantra that a consistent applica-
tion of Madisonian separationist principles would be inherently hostile to relig-
ion, since it "would require government in all its multifaceted roles to acknowl-
edge only the secular, to the exclusion and so to the detriment of the religious."7
The separationists' hope to preserve the Madisonian legacy must therefore rest
with a Justice who has announced forthrightly that the Establishment Clause
does not require the government "to avoid any action that acknowledges or aids
religion.' 8
This Article addresses the details and implications of the new integra-
tionist approach to the Establishment Clause. The first section discusses the
lingering effects of the Court's long but imperfect embrace of the theory of
separation of church and state. The second section discusses the major compo-
nents of the new integrationist paradigm of the Establishment Clause. The third
section discusses what this new paradigm portends for the Establishment Clause
doctrine that frames the innumerable cases involving clashes between politically
powerful religious majorities and the various types of religious (and irreligious)
dissenters. The fourth and final section suggests several caveats to the seeming
triumph of the new integrationist model of the Establishment Clause.
I. THE LINGERING EFFECTS OF SEPARATIONISM
The constitutional theory of church and state has been remarkably con-
sistent over the past half-century since the Supreme Court first began enforcing
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board of Education.9
Justice Black's majority opinion in that case set the rhetorical agenda for almost
all of the Court's subsequent missives on the subject of the First Amendment
and the relationship of church and state. In Everson, the self-proclaimed First
Amendment absolutist Justice Black1° set forth an appropriately unequivocal
theory of the Establishment Clause. As with his approach toward the First
Reagan Administration, Justice Alito wrote that in college he "developed a deep interest in consti-
tutional law, motivated in large part by disagreement with Warren Court decisions, particularly in
the areas of criminal procedure, the Establishment Clause, and reapportionment").
7 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
8 Id.
9 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10 See Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 559 (1962) (describing Black's "absolutism" in the First Amendment free
speech context).
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Amendment's Speech Clauses," Justice Black's stated approach to the Estab-
lishment Clause seemed to take the First Amendment's "no law" directive liter-
ally.
Of course, neither Justice Black's nor the full Court's Establishment
Clause practice has ever lived up to their strict separationist theory.' 2 In Ever-
son itself, for example, Justice Black provided the fifth vote to uphold New Jer-
sey's program providing state-financed transportation of students to religious
schools.' 3 In later cases the Court approved other government taxing and fi-
nancing schemes that benefited religion,' 4 along with various activities that had
the effect of subtly communicating the government's endorsement of religion,
5
while Justices insisted repeatedly that they were adhering to the Madisonian
separationist ideal.
16
II Id.
12 See Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
13 Id.
14 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding Cleveland school voucher
program, which provided substantial sums to parents of children attending religious schools);
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (permitting public school district to lend educational
materials and equipment to private religious schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
(allowing public school employees to teach remedial classes at private religious schools); Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (permitting a public school district to provide a
sign-language interpreter to a deaf student at a Catholic high school); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota tax program awarding tax deductions for educational ex-
penses, an overwhelming majority of which went to parents of children in religious schools);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (permitting city to grant tax exemption benefits to
religious organizations); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding a state program
requiring public school districts to purchase or loan textbooks to private religious schools).
15 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding the display of a monument
inscribed with the Ten Commandments on grounds of Texas State Capitol); County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding a government-sponsored display of a Menorah outside
government building); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding a city's inclusion of a
nativity scene in its holiday display); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the
Nebraska state legislature's practice of using government funds to hire a Christian minister to pray
before every legislative session); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday
closing laws).
16 Justice O'Connor was often the worst offender in the effort to approve government activities
that overtly embraced religion, while denying that any governmental endorsement was afoot. See,
for example, her strained effort in Lynch v. Donnelly to explain how a city's decision to erect a
display containing depictions of the baby Jesus in a manger were not intended to convey any
endorsement of Christianity: 'The evident purpose of including the creche in the larger display
was not promotion of the religious content of the creche but celebration of the public holiday
through its traditional symbols. Celebration of public holidays, which have cultural significance
even if they also have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In O'Connor's view, the Christmas display merely "acknowledged"
religion in the same fashion as a state legislature using government funds to hire a Christian chap-
lain to pray before every legislative session. Id. at 692-93 (referring to Marsh, 463 U.S. 783).
The line between "acknowledgement" and "endorsement" is very subtle, and is likely to be seen
most clearly by those belonging to the faith that the government is "acknowledging."
[Vol. 110
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss1/8
LIFE AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
Despite the Court's inconsistent application of its separationist ideals,
the repeated avowals of adherence to the principle of separation of church and
state are nevertheless significant. First, the Court's articulation of separationist
principles in its decisions permitting governmental financing or endorsement of
religion has constrained the scope of the Court's decisions, even when the
Court's actual holdings have sharply deviated from the separationist norm. The
Court's continued obeisance to separationist principles has limited the scope of
the Court's decisions, for example, by serving as the basis for the requirement
that religious financing and endorsement must be subsumed within broad gov-
ernment programs that have a generally secular focus.17 Separationist principles
have also limited the permissible justifications the Court has offered for other
government programs benefiting religion in non-financial ways. The Court's
inclination to preserve the cloak of separationism has forced those seeking to
justify instances of government favoritism toward religion to go through the
torturous exercise of claiming that official government-sponsored prayers and
other endorsements are not to be taken literally, but rather merely "serve, in the
only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of
solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encour-
aging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society."' 18 More im-
portantly, because of its separationist legacy, the Court has continued to prohibit
the government from overtly endorsing a particular religion or religion in gen-
eral, and from explicitly singling out religious individuals or groups for special
preferences.19 In each instance in which the Court has upheld a program or ac-
tivity that effectively benefits religion, in other words, the Court has been forced
to disavow-however implausibly-that the program or benefit in question has
the purpose or effect of favoring religion.2°
The second benefit that flows from even an imperfect application of
separationist theory by the Supreme Court is that it limits the ability of lower
courts to circumvent Establishment Clause rules with which some lower court
judges strongly disagree. There are a notable number of lower court judges who
17 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding Cleveland school voucher
program on the ground that the program was designed to be formally neutral among funding re-
cipients, even though ninety-six percent of the voucher funds went to parents of children in reli-
gious schools); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (emphasizing the breadth of the program in
upholding a Minnesota tax program awarding tax deductions for educational expenses, even
though ninety-six percent of the beneficiaries were parents of children in religious schools); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding extensive financial benefits to religious organi-
zations under a broadly construed tax emption program for nonprofit organizations).
18 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19 See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) ("[G]overnment... may not place
its prestige, coercive authority, or resources behind a single religious faith or behind religious
belief in general, compelling nonadherents to support the practices or proselytizing of favored
religious organizations and conveying the message that those who do not contribute gladly are less
than full members of the community.").
20 See cases cited supra note 17.
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resist the notion that the government cannot endorse religion or single out reli-
gious groups for special benefits in government programs. One of the most
notorious examples of this tendency is Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Edith Jones, who has complained that the courts have misread the Establishment
,,21Clause to "remake society in a secular image. Judge Jones goes on to com-
plain that "[w]hen our cultural heritage and tradition, indeed the three-millennial
history of the Western world threatens to be erased by three decades of federal
court pronouncements, something is amiss. ''22 Although Judge Jones expresses
this tendency more vociferously than most, her views are not idiosyncratic on
the Fifth Circuit. In an opinion published just five months after the Supreme
Court ruled in Lee v. Weisman23 that the inclusion of prayer at a public high
school graduation ceremony violates the Establishment Clause, for example, a
Fifth Circuit panel (which did not include Judge Jones) stubbornly upheld a
graduation prayer policy at a public high school in the Houston, Texas sub-
urbs.24 In its opinion the Fifth Circuit panel distinguished Lee on the basis of a
tortured state action analysis. The court argued that the school board's decision
to permit the students to vote on having prayer at their graduation insulated the
prayer from Lee and the Establishment Clause by rendering the prayer a private
action of the students rather than public action of the state.25 "The practical re-
sult of our decision, viewed in light of Lee, is that a majority of students can do
what the State acting on its own cannot do to incorporate prayer in public high
school graduation ceremonies. 26 The Fifth Circuit was not alone in engaging in
a private action fandango to avoid the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
rulings that the lower courts regarded as too inhospitable to religion. The Elev-
enth Circuit engaged in exactly the same tactic to uphold a similar graduation
prayer policy in Duval County, Florida.2 7
In one sense the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' school prayer decisions ar-
guably undermine the thesis that the Supreme Court's overtures to separation-
ism actually advance the cause of separating church and state. These decisions
seem to indicate that even in the area in which the high Court has adhered most
strongly to the separationist theory-cases involving prayer in public schools-
hostile lower courts easily circumvented that theory and permitted the infusion
of religion into the public schools. On the other hand, even in these cases it is
21 Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 286 (5th Cir. 1996) (Jones, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc).
22 Id.
23 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
24 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 967 (1993).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 972.
27 Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (upholding school board's
"Graduation Prayer" policy, which permitted graduating students to vote on whether to include
prayers or other student messages at the beginning and closing of graduation ceremonies).
[Vol. 110
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easy to see the constraining effects of separationism on the lower courts. First,
to get around the Supreme Court's school prayer decisions, both the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits had to engage in some doctrinal hair-splitting that did not pass
muster even with some of the very conservative members of the lower courts
themselves.28 Second, the deep inconsistencies between Jones and the Supreme
Court's separationist school prayer doctrine led subsequent Fifth Circuit panels
essentially to quarantine the Jones decision by limiting the scope of the decision
to its precise facts. 29 Finally, the clear disjunction between the lower courts'
efforts to privatize Establishment Clause violations and the contrary thrust of
many years of Supreme Court doctrine in the area rendered the lower courts'
logic an easy target once the Supreme Court considered the privatization argu-
ment in its most recent school prayer decision.
30
The third benefit that has flowed from the Supreme Court's nods in the
direction of separationism has been the educational value of those respectful
references. However imperfectly the Court has enforced its separationist ten-
dencies, the Court's repeated avowal of separationist values has created a cul-
ture in which the separation of church and state has entered the popular con-
sciousness as a defining ideal of American constitutionalism. Despite the fact
that the Court has repeatedly recoiled from enforcing true separationism, the
Court's repetition of separationist values has apparently had a concrete effect on
28 See id. at 1348 (Carnes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Eleventh Circuit majority for reading
the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), too nar-
rowly and arguing that "we ought to spend less time comparing the factual and procedural details
of the Santa Fe case to this one and more time considering the lessons that decision teaches").
29 See Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006), reh'g en banc
granted, 478 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 2007) (striking down the practice of saying prayers at school
board meetings, distinguishing Jones); Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 806, affd, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
(striking down public school board policy permitting voluntary student prayer at football games,
distinguishing Jones); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (strik-
ing down the Mississippi school prayer statute, distinguishing Jones); Doe v. Duncanville Indep.
Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 412 (5th Cir. 1995) (striking down various school prayer activities, distin-
guishing Jones, and holding that the court's ruling in Jones "was limited to very specific circum-
stances which are not present here"). This reversal in the Establishment Clause trend within the
Fifth Circuit caused other Fifth Circuit judges to complain that "our court's recent Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is not only inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, as well as ours, but is
also so erroneous and unwarranted it will be understood by some as being nothing less than hostile
toward religion." Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 201 F.3d 602, 603 (5th Cir. 2000)
(Barksdale, J., dissenting to the denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
30 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 290 (striking down school board policy permitting students to
vote on including prayer at public high school football games). Of course, a lower court that is
truly dedicated to circumventing the Supreme Court's precedents can still find room to maneuver.
See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330 (11 th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065
(2001) (upholding public school board policy permitting students to vote on including prayer at
public high school graduation ceremonies); see Adler, 250 F.3d at 1348 (Carnes, J., dissenting)
("[W]e ought to spend less time comparing the factual and procedural details of the Santa Fe case
to this one and more time considering the lessons that decision teaches.
One of those lessons is that a school board may not delegate to the student body or some subgroup
of it the power to do by majority vote what the school board itself may not do.").
2007]
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public expectations about the proper relationship between church and state.
Although it would be impossible empirically to verify the existence of this cause
and effect, one piece of anecdotal evidence that lends credence to this theory is
the fact that opponents of separationism seem driven to distraction by the
Court's failure formally to abandon separationism. How else can one explain
the bizarrely vociferous and persistent debate over the legitimacy of judicial
references to Thomas Jefferson's use of the phrase "wall of separation between
Church and State" in his famous Letter to the Danbury Baptists?31 The oppo-
nents of separation are not overreacting; they accurately perceive that the
Court's articulation of constitutional principle is often just as important as its
decisions in the actual cases. Even if there has never been a truly impervious
legal wall between church and state, the Court's separationist statements over
the years have erected a psychological wall that may turn out to be almost as
effective. This is why the opponents of separationism cannot be satisfied with
winning cases; they must also rip the presumptions of separationism from con-
stitutional theory and replace them with a completely different theory in which
the church is recognized as the legitimate handmaiden of the state.
In sum, from a separationist perspective, even though the Court has
been only imperfectly committed to the separationist ideal, we have continued
to enjoy numerous benefits from the Court's pretence that it is fully committed
to that ideal. Regardless of the extent to which we all agree with the goal of
separating church and state, or the supposed benefits that separationists believe
accompany that goal, we can all certainly agree that a majority of the Court is
now poised to abandon altogether the separationist cause. The Court's new ma-
jority is prepared, in other words, to exchange the old separationist Establish-
ment Clause paradigm for the new integrationist paradigm. The next section
will describe the key features of that new paradigm.
II. THE THEORY OF THE INTEGRATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The central themes of the separationist Establishment Clause paradigm
are not difficult to identify. Most of these themes can be found in the two most
important documentary backdrops of the separationist Establishment Clause,
both produced during the fight over religious establishments in Virginia-James
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Establishments32 and
Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.33 Several mem-
bers of the Court reiterated the central themes found in these documents (with-
31 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a Committee of the Danbury
Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 303
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
32 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, re-
printed in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947).
33 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON 251-53 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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out dissent) in the various opinions in Everson,34 and these themes have been
repeated in countless subsequent decisions. There are five main themes in the
separationist Establishment Clause paradigm. These themes are: (1) the Estab-
lishment Clause creates an American political structure that is essentially secu-
lar in nature; (2) the religious majority cannot use its political dominance to
enlist the government to endorse or otherwise advance the majority's sectarian
views; (3) a citizen's religious views (or lack of religious views) are irrelevant
to that citizen's political status; (4) the rules regarding religious establishments
are national rules, which prohibit overwhelmingly dominant local religious ma-
jorities from exercising their dominance over even extremely small and unpopu-
lar local religious minorities; and (5) the Establishment Clause is a subset of the
unifying First Amendment premise that it is presumptively impermissible for
the government to enforce any collective assertion of ultimate value.
The Court's new integrationist majority fundamentally disagrees with
each of these themes, and various members of the new majority have specifi-
cally renounced these themes and the broader concepts of individual rights and
limited governmental authority that these themes represent. Several members of
the new integrationist majority have explicitly articulated counter-themes that
form the core of the new integrationist Establishment Clause paradigm. These
integrationist counter-themes include the following premises: (1) United States
is a religious country, and the United States government is and always has been
defined by and structured around the culture's religious principles and precepts;
(2) in the American political system the religious majority should be allowed to
exercise its political influence on the government; (3) religion is a relevant fac-
tor in political decision-making; (4) local religious majorities have a legitimate
interest in infusing their community with the dominant religious perspective;
and (5) moral and theological relativism is not a constitutional command, and in
fact is deleterious to the commonweal; therefore, the government is not required
to shy away from incorporating moral absolutes into its legal mandates.
The remainder of this section will discuss each of these themes and
counter-themes, with an eye toward ascertaining what a newly theocratized
Constitution portends for the government's relationship with an increasingly
diverse American population.
A. Theme One: American Political Culture is Defined by Religion
The first and most important component of the separationist Establish-
ment Clause paradigm is the proposition that the First Amendment mandates a
secular government, which is independent of any church and free of religious
control, religious tests, and other sectarian prerequisites for political participa-
tion. It has become axiomatic in the separationist era that:
34 Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
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[N]either a State nor the Federal Government can constitution-
ally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any relig-
ion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose require-
ments which aid all religions as against non-believers, and nei-
ther can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.35
The Court was equally clear during its separationist era that powerful religious
factions could not use their political clout to install their form of religious belief
as the nation's preferred faith, or enforce their religious prerogatives and man-
dates on politically weaker citizens who do not share the majority's faith.3 6
Hence, for over thirty years discussions of whether legislation conforms to the
Establishment Clause have been dominated by the notoriously separationist
three-part Lemon test. The Lemon test mandates that "[ffirst, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' ' 37 Thus, the
Lemon test prohibits not only laws that have a secular effect, but also facially
neutral laws that were enacted with religious motives. The Lemon test rein-
forces the separationist perspective that the government not only cannot tell a
citizen which god to believe in, it also cannot tell a citizen which holy com-
mands to obey. From this perspective, religion, its mandates, and its conse-
quences are totally outside the realm of the government's competence and au-
thority; in a separationist world these aspects of life are allocated entirely to the
private sector for individuals to decide on their own, free of political coercion
and influence.
This first theme of secular governance and the resulting privatization of
religion represents the core of the entire separationist enterprise. At the end of
the day, the single most important consequence of the separation principle is the
creation of a secular government, free of religious dominance, control, or ma-
nipulation. The state is not beholden to religious authorities and is structurally
independent from religious institutions. The paradox is that this actually bene-
fits religion and religious practitioners. Contrary to the usual criticism of sepa-
ration principle,38 the separation of church and state does not entail institutional-
ized governmental hostility to religion. The reality under a separationist Estab-
35 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (citation omitted).
36 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prohibiting public school
authorities from allowing the majority of students to vote on including prayer at public school
functions outside the classroom); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prohibiting the state of
New York from injecting into public school classrooms a state authorized prayer); Torcaso, 367
U.S. at 488 (prohibiting the state of Maryland from requiring applicants for notary public commis-
sions to declare a belief in God).
37 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
38 See, e.g., Justice Kennedy's comment at supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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lishment Clause is exactly the opposite of the picture usually painted by oppo-
nents of separationism: A separationist Establishment Clause works in conjunc-
tion with other parts of the First Amendment (including the Speech and the Free
Exercise Clauses) to create a vibrant and dynamic private sector, in which relig-
ion is immunized from political interference or control. Religion becomes
stronger under such a system because it does not have to defend itself constantly
from the state.
The separationist view of the Establishment Clause embodies certain as-
sumptions about both religion and politics. The underlying assumption about
politics is that in a proper democracy, religion should be primarily a private
phenomenon because religion and politics are simply incompatible. That is, the
Madisonian governmental model assumes that religion is particularly ill-suited
to the sorts of pressures and influences that define the political process. Com-
bining the typical political phenomena of personal greed, self-aggrandizement,
duplicity, log-rolling, dealmaking, and unprincipled compromise, with the typi-
cal religious phenomena of theological certainty, absolute moral dictates, and
the threat of eternal damnation, creates an especially dangerous cocktail. The
Madisonian governmental model embodies a complementary assumption about
the nature of religion. The assumption with regard to religion is that it is no
longer possible in the modern world to decide collectively matters that are by
their nature nonrational, metaphysical, and impervious to both empirical analy-
sis and logical proof or disproof. In a pluralistic society in which multiple fac-
tions believe absolutely in matters that none of them can prove, the separationist
perspective is that it is best for society if everyone is permitted to follow their
own faith where it leads, without having to worry about their safety in the com-
pany of others who are devoted to contradictory moral and theological abso-
lutes.
These are the central Madisonian assumptions about religion and poli-
tics, which the Court's new majority is apparently willing to reject in favor of a
political model that recognizes the possibility of collective determinations of
ultimate truths, and subjects those truths to the vicissitudes and distortions of
political power. The Court's new integrationist majority disagrees fundamen-
tally with separationism's central premise of secular governance, both on his-
torical and theoretical grounds. The historical argument is that the United States
has always been a religious culture, which the government's actions have al-
ways reflected. The theoretical argument takes two different forms. The ab-
stract form of the theoretical argument asserts that some mediating institution
such as religion is necessary to imbue the proceduralist liberal state with value.
The pragmatic form of the theoretical argument asserts that as a matter of First
Amendment jurisprudence and democratic theory, religious perspectives cannot
legitimately be distinguished from all other perspectives. Therefore, the integra-
tionists assert, excluding religious perspectives from the government illegiti-
mately discriminates against a major portion of the American electorate.
As for the historical argument, the new integrationists argue that history
demonstrates that American political culture-and therefore the government
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that arises from that culture-is, and always has been, defined by and infused
with religion. Their general perspective is that (as the early integrationist Chief
Justice Burger once summed up this stance), "Our history is replete with official
references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and
pronouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders. 39 In sup-
port of their view that the country has always accepted sectarian aspects to its
political policies, integrationists often emphasize religious proclamations by
Presidents, starting with President Washington,n° congressional decisions to hire
legislative chaplains,4' and decisions by the federal government to finance reli-
gious schools on public lands during the early days of country's existence.42
Justice Scalia has even asserted in the context of a dispute over public school
prayer-perhaps the most controversial church/state issue-that officially sanc-
tioned nondenominational prayers "are so characteristically American they
could have come from the pen of George Washington or Abraham Lincoln him-
self.,4 3 The history and implications of the inclusion of religion into govern-
mental affairs is actually far darker and more ambiguous than the integrationists
acknowledge. This aspect of the history will be discussed briefly in Section IV.
But the point for present purposes is that the gist of the integrationist argument
asserts that the integration of church and state is the norm in this country, and
the separation of church and state is a recent deviation from that norm. Once a
religious country, always a religious country; this is the integrationist credo.
The theoretical arguments in favor of integrating church and state com-
plement the integrationists' historical claims. The abstract form of the theoreti-
cal argument in favor of integrating church and state has been articulated most
forcefully in the academic literature. Although there are important variations
among each of these versions of the integrationist position, they each state some
version of a principle once articulated by Congress in the Northwest Ordinance,
a statement frequently cited by judicial proponents of the integrationist position:
"Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged."44
The classic exposition of this position can be found in Michael McCon-
nell's 1985 defense of religious accommodations. 5 In this article McConnell
addresses the proper role of religion in the liberal democratic state. According
to McConnell, the liberal state is a denuded proceduralist shell, which by its
39 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).
40 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 101 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
42 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
44 See The Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n. (a), ART. III quoted in Wallace, 472 U.S. at
100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45 See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (1985).
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very nature has no animating moral purpose. "[T]he liberal state itself cannot
ultimately be the source ... of the people's values. 4 6 Within this context, relig-
ion is "special 4 7 because it is one of the primary means of providing the moral
basis for social life and political policy, which, liberal constitutionalism is unable
to generate independently. McConnell argues that "republican self-government
could not succeed unless religion continued to foster a moral sense in the peo-
ple.",48  Thus, liberal democracies require "mediating institutions" such as
churches to provide a context in which "citizens in a liberal polity learn to tran-
scend their individual interests and opinions and to develop civic responsibil-
ity."'49 This acculturation function is what McConnell calls the "'political' ef-
fect[] of religion."50 According to this theory, the separation of church and state
is actually deleterious to the long-term development of social norms necessary
to make a democracy thrive. This approach challenges the desirability of at-
tempting to build society on a foundation of value-neutral empiricism, rational-
ism, and scientism. These are the key components of the secular rationality at
the heart of the separation principle, which McConnell and others, such as Pro-
fessor Chip Lupu, have argued is not "particularly conducive to the life of the
spirit, without which it may not be possible for a nation to thrive."'', At the end
of the day, therefore, the integrationist position would require us to fundamen-
tally recast our constitutional view of the state, and renounce once and for all the
notion that church and state could (or should) be kept separate; "the state itself,"
McConnell argues, "is religiously pluralistic-not secular. 52
The pragmatic version of the theoretical argument for an integrationist
Establishment Clause takes a much more focused approach to the subject than
the abstract version of the argument. The pragmatic claim is that a separationist
interpretation of the Establishment Clause discriminates against religion and
religious perspectives in a way that is contrary to the general theme of content
and viewpoint neutrality that permeates the First Amendment. There are several
subordinate themes to this argument.
The first subordinate theme of the antidiscrimination argument is that
the government should treat religious perspectives on political matters the same
as all other perspectives. In its purest form, this is a claim about expressive
rights under the Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. As Justice Scalia has
noted, "in Anglo-American history, at least, government suppression of speech
has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech
46 Id. at 16.
47 Id. at 18.
48 Id. at 19.
49 Id. at 17.
50 Id. at 19.
51 Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 279
(1993).
52 McConnell, supra note 45, at 41.
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clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince., 53 In contexts in
which the religious speech is entirely private and could not be mistaken for
speech by the government, few people would disagree with this proposition.
Many classical free-speech cases involved religious speakers. The Jehovah's
Witnesses alone can take credit for establishing many of today's most important
First Amendment rights and doctrines.54 The key to these cases, however, is
that the speech is entirely private. The case in which Justice Scalia made the
comment quoted above, however, involved private speech that occurred in a
context in which the private speech could be mistaken for speech by the gov-
ernment. 55 Justice Scalia and other integrationists on the Court find this distinc-
tion irrelevant, which leads them to proffer the second subordinate theme of
their antidiscrimination argument.
The second subordinate theme of the antidiscrimination argument is that
precluding the government from advancing a religious cause presents the same
constitutional problems as restricting speech on religious subjects or limiting
gatherings for religious purposes in the private sector. The integrationists are
not primarily concerned with protecting religious activity in the private sector.
Rather, they are primarily concerned with injecting religion into government.
Michael McConnell, for example, has argued that "the idea of 'separation be-
tween church and state' is either meaningless, or (worse) is a prescription for
secularization of areas of life that are properly pluralistic., 56 In the same vein,
Justice Kennedy once asserted that imposing limits on the government's ability
to "acknowledge" the majority's faith "would border on latent hostility to relig-
ion."57 From the integrationist perspective, interpreting the Constitution to bar
religious groups from capturing control of the government and adopting politi-
cal policies that are consistent with their sectarian points of view would amount
to "hostility" or discrimination toward those groups. The only way to avoid
53 Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion).
54 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002) (striking down a broad city permit scheme that limited door-to-door advocacy); Woo-
ley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (upholding the right of a Jehovah's Witness to refuse to
display an objectionable state motto on his license plate); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953) (upholding the right of a Jehovah's Witness to preach in a public park); West Virginia Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding the right of Jehovah's Witness children to
decline to recite the Pledge of Allegiance); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (strik-
ing down an ordinance that imposed a flat fee on door-to-door solicitation); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down a statute prohibiting solicitation for charitable activities
without prior approval of the state).
55 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 753 (upholding the right of private groups to place a large Roman
cross in a park adjacent to state buildings).
56 Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should
be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 639, 640-41 (1999).
57 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 637 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
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such discrimination, therefore, is to allow those religious groups to exercise
their political power to impose their views on others through law.
The third subordinate theme of the antidiscrimination argument com-
plements the second theme. The third subordinate theme is that by refusing to
endorse religion or advance religious causes, the government is in effect endors-
ing secularism and advancing an anti-religious cause. Chip Lupu, for example,
has observed that:
[S]trong separationism itself may well have favored irreligion,
because it lined up state power with secular rationality. One of
the powerful lessons of the past twenty years of American law
and history is that an ideology of secular rationality is not ob-
jective or neutral but is partial to a particular set of institutions
(most notably science and th- markets).58
At times, integrationists even seem to argue that enforcement of the constitu-
tional principle of separation of church and state is part of the government's
surreptitious plan to eradicate religion, or at least neuter it. Stephen Carter, for
example, once argued that separating church and state is part of the govern-
ment's effort to:
[E]nsure that intermediate institutions, such as the religions, do
not get in the way of the government's will. Perhaps, in short,
it is a way of ensuring that only one vision of the meaning of
reality-that of the powerful group of individuals called the
state-is allowed a political role.59
Assertions such as Professor Carter's are very puzzling. Given a mod-
em political context in which it is highly doubtful that an avowed atheist or ag-
nostic could ever get elected to a major political office in vast portions of the
country, the belief that a cabal of pagans in legal and political circles is hell-bent
(so to speak) on using the First Amendment to annihilate the very institution of
religion is simple fantasy. These assertions do not reflect the modern American
cultural reality, although such statements do illustrate the extent to which the
integrationist perspective on the Constitution reflects in legal terms the victimi-
zation and social ostracism felt by some religious persons. These statements
also illustrate the extent to which disputes over the integration of religion into
government have become intertwined with larger issues that are generally
58 Lupu, supra note 51, at 279.
59 STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 123 (BasicBooks, A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.
1993).
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lumped together under the term "the culture wars. ' 6° Disputes about religion
and sin lie just below the surface of many of the Court's most fractious recent
decisions involving personal liberties, including those involving gay rights,61
sexual freedom, 62 and abortion.
63
In light of the growing confluence of religion and politics, it is clear that
at the most basic level, church/state integrationists disagree comprehensively
with the separationist perspective that religion is at heart a private, individual
matter that is best left to each individual believer and that person's faith com-
munity. In contrast to the separationist approach to religion as quintessentially a
private matter, integrationists view religion as in many important respects a col-
lective enterprise. To integrationists, religious faith can only be fully realized if
it is celebrated and appreciated in public by groups of believers or, indeed, by
society as a whole. As Justice Scalia once argued in the public school context:
Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if religion
were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely per-
sonal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like por-
nography, in the privacy of one's room. For most believers it is
not that, and has never been. Religious men and women of al-
most all denominations have felt it necessary to acknowledge
and beseech the blessing of God as a people, and not just as in-
dividuals, because they believe in the "protection of divine
Providence," as the Declaration of Independence put it, not just
for individuals but for societies; because they believe God to be,
as Washington's first Thanksgiving Proclamation put it, the
"Great Lord and Ruler of Nations.
64
60 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When the Court
takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins-and more
specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the
Court's Members are drawn.").
61 See id. at 620; Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (prohibiting New Jersey
from applying to the Boy Scouts a state statute outlawing discrimination against homosexuals).
62 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986). The religious nature of this dispute was made explicit in Chief Justice Burger's concur-
ring opinion in Bowers, in which he noted: "Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual
conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization.
Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical stan-
dards." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
63 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that abortion regulations predicated on state determinations
that life begins at conception violate the Establishment Clause because such regulations have no
secular purpose and represent "an unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no
means all Christian faiths...").
64 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The melding of the immediate and temporal interests of politics and
government with the eternal and celestial interests of the church is central to the
integrationist enterprise. In the integrationist scheme of government, the politi-
cal use of religion does not just help guide the country's leaders and provide a
moral grounding for political action; religion is actually used to certify that the
nation is carrying out God's will. The use of religion by government communi-
cates the message that political decisions represent more than the crass self-
interest of whatever set of political participants happen to rule the day. The
political victors therefore represent more than just themselves; they-and the
nation they govern-become part of God's plan. With regard to the battle over
the inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, therefore, it is totally
in keeping with the integrationist perspective on the relationship between church
and state that the White House bugler struck up the tune "Onward, Christian
Soldiers!" at the ceremony at which President Eisenhower signed the statute
integrating the political majority's most basic religious belief into the nation's
Pledge.65
B. Theme Two: The Religious Perspective of the Government will be that
of the Religious Majority
One advantage of the separationist perspective on the Establishment
Clause is that it avoids the need to identify criteria for determining the extent to
which any religious group has a compelling claim to exercise political power
and incorporate its views into law. To a separationist, no religious group has a
legitimate claim on political power; therefore, regardless of how much political
might a particular religious faction might possess, that faction is not permitted to
exercise its clout by imposing its sectarian views on others. To a church/state
integrationist, on the other hand, identifying the appropriate religious faction to
serve as the guiding sectarian influence on American government presents a
significant problem. If, as posited by the abstract theoretical argument in favor
of the integrationist paradigm, religious influence over government is necessary
to provide the civic virtue that is required for enlightened governance, then
some particular set of religious principles and precepts must be identified as
giving substance to the concept of civic virtue.
65 See 100 CONG. REc. S8617 (1954):
On that June day, within a few minutes after the signature of the President had
written "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, the bill that legalized it
leaped to life in a scene silhouetted against the white dome of the Capitol.
There stood Senator Homer Ferguson, who had sponsored the resolution in the
Senate, and with him a group of legislative colleagues from both houses of
Congress. As the radio carried their voices to listening thousands, together
these lawmakers repeated the pledge which is now the Nation's. Then, appro-
priately, as the flag was raised a bugle rang out with the familiar strains of
"Onward, Christian Soldiers!"
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Integrationists often argue as if the religious principles that should be
integrated into government policies are broad, universal, and incontestable, as
when Justice Scalia argued in a school prayer case that religious believers
should be allowed to "join... in prayer together, to the God whom they all wor-
ship and seek., 66 The basic integrationist claim is that aside from a small hand-
ful of noisy kvetches, we "all" want to incorporate religion into government and
can "all" agree on the details of what "religion" means. But the fact that Justice
Scalia's statement was made in a case in which someone went so far as to bring
a lawsuit to defend her right to avoid a prayer belies the notion that "all" believ-
ers seek to pray together in the same way and to the same God. Indeed, it seems
self-evident from centuries of religious conflict that religious practitioners pur-
sue their faiths in very different ways, and that religious principles are often
inherently contentious and mutually exclusionary. This is precisely the integra-
tionist's dilemma. Once we accept the claim that religion is necessary for good
governance, we have to decide what we mean by "religion." So at some point,
if the Court accepts the integrationist perspective on the Establishment Clause, it
will have to set forth an analytical framework for separating the correct reli-
gious principles, which the government can integrate into its policies, from the
incorrect religious principles, which the government may renounce.
The integrationists respond to the dilemma of having to distinguish
good religion from bad by resorting to a ham-fisted majoritarianism, coupled
with a disingenuous elision of the knotty issues that have forever divided reli-
gious factions competing for power in the political sphere. Justice Scalia has
already written the schematic for this aspect of the integrationist agenda.
Step one in the integrationists' majoritarian schematic is to lump to-
gether the major mainstream faiths and to assert in the face of all historical evi-
dence to the contrary that these faiths have exercised political power essentially
in unison throughout the nation's history. In his opinion in the recent Ten
Commandments decision,67 for example, Justice Scalia makes this point by as-
serting that the government should be allowed to endorse the existence of God
and the overtly religious axioms embodied in the Ten Commandments because
the Commandments are embraced by the "97.7% of all believers [who] are
monotheistic. 68 Thus, in one fell swoop, Scalia manages to avoid the uncom-
fortable political implications of the rather obvious theological conflicts among
adherents of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity; suggest a reason to override soci-
ety's resistance to religious establishments, which arises from the collective
memory of multiple historical examples of anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic ac-
tions by government; and dilute the rich stew of centuries of religious belief into
the bland, featureless, and nutritionally empty broth of "monotheism."
66 Lee, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 894.
[Vol. 110
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss1/8
LIFE AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
The reduction of all major branches of Western religious thought into a
generic brand of monotheism leads to step two of the integrationists' majori-
tarian schematic, which subtly adopts as the lodestar for Establishment Clause
theory the proposition urged several decades earlier by then-Justice Rehnquist:
The Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality
between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal
Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion.
There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that
the Framers intended to build the "wall of separation" that was
constitutionalized in Everson.
69
In other words, the integrationists implicitly assert that as long as the
government does not prefer one religious sect over another, the government is
within its authority to favor religion in general over non-religion. According to
Justice Scalia's more recent rendition of this "nonpreferentialist" approach to
the Establishment Clause, the religious principles and teachings of the Ten
Commandments "are recognized across such a broad and diverse range of the
population-from Christians to Muslims-that they cannot be reasonably un-
derstood as a government endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint.,'
70
Thus, Justice Scalia essentially asserts that the Decalogue's command to ob-
serve the Sabbath and keep it holy, 71 its prohibition of making idols, 72 having
"other gods before me,"73 or coveting thy neighbor's wife7 4 have all become
uncontroversially universal commands, which have been endorsed by the entire
society-or, more precisely, the "97.7% of all believers [who are] monotheis-
tic"75-through mutual (albeit silent) consent.
It is important to recognize what is omitted from the picture Justice
Scalia paints of broad religious consensus. Most obviously, the "97.7%" figure
he uses to describe society's virtual unanimity on these matters is a wildly
skewed and grossly inaccurate depiction of the religious landscape of the mod-
69 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The definitive rejoinder to
Justice Rehnquist's arguments and the historical support he musters in favor of those arguments
remains Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim about Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875 (1986).
70 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing in the context of a dispute over prayer at a public school graduation ceremony
that the Establishment Clause prohibits officially sanctioned prayer "where the endorsement is
sectarian, in the sense of specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevo-
lent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the divinity of
Christ)," but does not prohibit a nondenominational prayer sponsored by the state).
71 See Deuteronomy 5:12.
72 See Deuteronomy 5:8.
73 See Deuteronomy 5:7.
74 See Deuteronomy 5:18.
75 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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em United States. Although he acknowledges omitting from his majoritarian
mix Hindus, Buddhists, and other "believers in unconcerned deities, 76 Justice
Scalia neglects to mention that he also omits from his snapshot of America the
roughly twenty percent of the population that is agnostic, atheist, or avowedly
nonreligious.77 He also neglects to mention that many members of the sects that
he does include in the dominant religious faction definitively reject his view on
the integration of religious principles into government. Traditional Roger Wil-
liams-style Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, most Jews,
many Presbyterians, and other modern nonfundamentalist Protestants reject the
notion that their religious views should be integrated into the government's
policies and symbols.
When all is said and done, Justice Scalia is articulating a position that
does not represent the views of 97.7% of the country's citizens; rather, under the
most optimistic calculations, he is stating a position that may represent the
views of only a bare majority of the citizenry. Section IV will deal with the
political implications of attempting to exclude a large swath of the nation's
population from the group of citizens who are empowered to define the coun-
try's moral core. But for the moment it should be noted that the exclusion of
significant portions of the population is an inevitable feature of the integrationist
position. The simple fact is that most religious groups disagree with each other
about very basic theological issues. Any attempt to define the theological over-
lap between sects will either dilute religion to the point that it means nothing
whatsoever or will exclude large groups of people due to disagreements about
matters that go to the very heart of their religious faith. These are the only two
options. Therefore, assuming that the new integrationist majority is not inter-
ested in diluting religion to the point of meaninglessness, theological exclusion-
ism is the inevitable consequence of adopting their constitutional agenda.
If this description is accurate, then it highlights one of the most disturb-
ing features of the integrationist assertion that the Establishment Clause should
be interpreted to permit religion to be a central part of defining the civic virtue
that guides the government: It seems inevitable that the integrationist paradigm
will produce a system that is exclusionary, divisive, and inherently sectarian.
Unless the term "religion" is defined in a way that encompasses literally every
point of view (in which case the concept of civic virtue would lose all meaning),
then the views of some non-virtuous persons and groups must be deemed con-
trary to the commonweal as defined by the religious beliefs favored by the po-
litical majority. If the purpose of the exercise is to provide a strong and virtuous
moral foundation for government, then some attempt must be made to protect
the government's basic moral precepts from attack by those who are unfit to
govern. Thus, the third and final step of the integrationists' majoritarian sche-
matic is to devalue the political standing of all those who do not fit within the
76 Id. at 893.
77 See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
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broad scope of the religious majority's belief system. Thus, again in Justice
Scalia's phrasing of this point, "With respect to public acknowledgment of reli-
gious belief, it is entirely clear from our Nation's historical practices that the
Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in un-
concerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists. 78
The implications of this blunt statement should not be understated. It
acknowledges forthrightly the political consequences of the integrationist ap-
proach to the Establishment Clause. The adoption of the integrationist approach
to the Establishment Clause inevitably leads to the embrace of religious majori-
tarianism, which for these purposes is functionally identical to religious sectari-
anism. Embracing religious majoritarianism likewise leads the government not
only to use religious symbols and principles for political purposes, but also to
develop mechanisms for enforcing the population's obeisance to the religious
majority's dominance in defining the civic virtue that guides the country's po-
litical policies. Even in the upcoming integrationist era, it will not be possible
to formalize these enforcement mechanisms as legal mandates; there is no indi-
cation that the integrationists would seek to rescind the "No Religious Test"
Clause 79 or overrule Torcaso v. Watkins.80 But as the Court permits the gov-
ernment greater leeway in aiding religious institutions through public financing
and permits the government to explicitly endorse religious views through the
incorporation of religious symbols and principles into official activities, the
Court simultaneously provides the government with a subtle means of advanc-
ing the view that religious belief is an essential requisite for political activity.81
If the integrationists have their way, the religious phenomenon of excommuni-
cation will now have an informal but effective analog in the political realm.
C. Theme Three: The Political Majority can use the Government to Ad-
vance Specific Aspects of its Religious Agenda
Once the first and second themes of the new integrationist Establish-
ment Clause theory are firmly ensconced in constitutional doctrine, the next
three themes of the theory follow inexorably. The third theme of the new inte-
grationist paradigm is that the political majority can use the government to ad-
vance specific components of its religious agenda. In other words, in addition to
78 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
80 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("Neither [state nor federal governments]
can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-
believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs.").
81 In one indication of how extensive the religious socialization of political participants has
already become, note that Democratic Party presidential candidates now wear their religion on
their sleeves just as ostentatiously as Republican Party candidates. See Patrick Healy and Michael
Luo, Edwards, Clinton and Obama Described Journeys of Faith, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at
A20.
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broadly endorsing generic religious concepts such as the notion that this is a
nation "under God," the government can also enforce through law specific poli-
cies that are explicitly predicated upon religious purposes and principles. As
discussed further in the next section, the "no secular purpose" mandate of the
three-part Lemon test that has governed Establishment Clause doctrine for over
thirty years will have no place in the new integrationist constitutional universe.
The notion that the government can enforce religiously-based com-
mands and objectives follows directly from the first integrationist theme that
religion provides a necessary moral foundation for governance. As noted
above,82 there are three aspects to the first theme of the integrationist paradigm.
The first is that God has always been part of America's political culture, and so
current governmental policies should reflect the country's traditional religiosity.
The second is that a religious basis for government is necessary to avoid having
politics collapse into a simple competition for power among unprincipled, self-
interested factions. The third is that religious individuals should be given full
access to political power in the same way that members of all other factions are
allowed to implement their ideological and moral objectives. In sum, since
government is comprised of many religious individuals, and since the develop-
ment of civic virtue largely depends on religious teachings, the content of which
go beyond the banal generalities involved in reciting "under God" in the Pledge
of Allegiance, then advancing the particular details of the government's reli-
gious agenda is even more important than having the government pay general
homage to the Almighty.
If the integrationists are correct that some external source of civic virtue
is necessary to sustain democratic government over time, and the concept of
civic virtue is construed as something more than platitudes, then the govern-
ment's political agenda and its religious agenda become inextricably inter-
twined. One can already see how these arguments get applied to specific Estab-
lishment Clause disputes in recent opinions by integrationist judges and Justices
in both the lower courts and on the Supreme Court. For example, in cases in-
volving disputes over religion in public schools, one can easily find examples of
the historical, abstract theoretical, and pragmatic theoretical arguments in favor
of the integration of church and state. An example of the historical argument
can be found in Justice Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman, in which he argues
that the public high school graduation prayers at issue in that case were "so
characteristically American they could have come from the pen of George
Washington or Abraham Lincoln himself."83 As for the abstract theoretical ar-
82 See supra notes 39-63 and accompanying text.
83 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 450 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that when the State of New York com-
posed the Regents Prayer and required it to be recited in public school classrooms, "what [it] has
done has been to recognize and to follow the deeply entrenched and highly cherished spiritual
traditions of our Nation-traditions which come down to us from those who almost two hundred
years ago avowed their 'firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence' when they pro-
claimed the freedom and independence of this brave new world").
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gument, integrationists have argued that the government should be allowed to
incorporate religion in the public schools in order to build students' character
and enhance their decisionmaking skills.84 The pragmatic theoretical argu-
ment-which asserts that church-state separation amounts to religious discrimi-
nation-was the focal point of lone dissenter Potter Stewart's opinion in the
Supreme Court's very first school prayer decision. Stewart argued that prohibit-
ing children from reciting the state prayer in that case would "deny the wish of
these school children to join in reciting this prayer [and] deny them the opportu-
nity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation. 85
Similar arguments appear in the religious endorsement cases outside the
public school context. In those cases, church-state integrationists often refer to
the country's religious heritage, and recite the same assorted examples of gov-
ernment endorsements of religion in both the early Republic and the modern era.
These examples include congressional decisions to hire legislative chaplains,86
presidential Thanksgiving proclamations 87 Congressional declarations of reli-
gious holidays,88 official prescriptions of religious mottos such as "In God We
Trust" and "One Nation under God, ' 89 and religious inscriptions on public
buildings, including the Supreme Court.90
The integrationists also recite their theoretical arguments in the non-
school endorsement cases. They argue, for example, that the government
should be allowed to acknowledge symbolically the common view that religious
morality is the basis for good governance and the law itself. "Our history is
replete with official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance in
deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary
leaders." 91
Finally, the antidiscrimination argument is a persistent undercurrent of
the often angry opinions by integrationists on the Court, who vociferously dis-
pute the notion that the Constitution mandates a thoroughly secular government.
84 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 967 (1993):
The Court has repeatedly held that the Establishment Clause forbids the
imposition of religion through public education. That leads to difficulty be-
cause of public schools' responsibility to develop pupils' character and deci-
sionmaking skills, a responsibility more important in a society suffering from
parental failure. If religion be the foundation, or at least relevant to these func-
tions and to the education of the young, as is widely believed, it follows that
religious thought should not be excluded as irrelevant to public education.
85 Engel, 370 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-87 (1983).
87 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 676.
90 Id. at 676-77.
91 Id. at 675.
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The pique evident in Justice Kennedy's opinion in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU92 is a prime example of this phenomenon. Justice Kennedy argues that
using the First Amendment to rigorously enforce the separation of church and
state "would require government in all its multifaceted roles to acknowledge
only the secular, to the exclusion and so to the detriment of the religious. 93
Along with the Court's other integrationists, Justice Kennedy argues that "the
Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and ac-
commodating the central role religion plays in our society," and that denying
government such latitude to embrace religion "would border on latent hostility
toward religion." 94 Likewise, according to Justice Kennedy, requiring federal
courts to become "jealous guardians of an absolute 'wall of separation"' would
send "a clear message of disapproval" of religion.95 In this context, as in others,
there is no sense that the integrationists have ever considered the possibility that
permitting the government to endorse religion (and therefore permitting the po-
litical majority to decide which religion to have the goernment endorse) might
communicate an even clearer message of disapproval to those whose faith does
not fit the majority's sectarian template.
The final area of frequent Establishment Clause litigation involves dis-
putes over government financing of religious institutions and activities. The
same integrationist arguments that appear in the public school and general en-
dorsement contexts also appear in slightly different forms in the government
financing cases. In the financing cases, as in the endorsement cases, integration-
ists turn to the country's early history, and can once again identify several in-
stances of government programs funneling public money to religious institu-
tions. These early financing programs were often part of the federal govern-
ment's effort to tame the country's restive Native American population. The
programs involved various social services, including education. Two favorite
citations of the genre are to the Northwest Ordinance 96 and several congres-
sional actions in the early 19th century setting aside public land in the North-
west Territory for schools, many of which were both private and sectarian.97
Integrationists use these actions of the early Congresses as proof of a long na-
tional tradition of "allowing religious adherents to participate in evenhanded
government programs."
98
Integrationist opinions in cases involving public financing of religious
activity also include versions of the theoretical arguments noted above. With
92 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989).
93 Id. at 657.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
97 See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 862 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (citing statutes).
98 Y-,
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regard to integrationist claims about the need to use religion to foster civic vir-
tue in the ordinary activities of government, integrationists argue that it is both
reasonable and constitutionally legitimate for government to organize its opera-
tions based on the assumption that the provision of social services by religious
groups will often be more effective than the provision of similar services by the
government itself or secular nonprofit groups. In one of the Court's earliest
integrationist opinions involving publicly financed religious social services pro-
grams, the Court held that there is nothing improper about Congress making the
"judgment that religious organizations can help solve the problems to which the
[statute] is addressed," 99 or "recognizing the important part that religion or reli-
gious organizations may play in resolving certain secular problems."'
1
'
°
The integrationists' anti-discrimination argument also figures promi-
nently in the public financing cases. Indeed, the version of the antidiscrimina-
tion argument used in the financing cases is often even more forceful than the
version that appears in endorsement cases. Justice Thomas even authored a
plurality opinion in one public financing case in which he suggested that it
might violate the Free Exercise Clause if the government excluded religious
institutions from an educational funding program that was otherwise directed at
public schools. 10 1 In the public financing cases, the anti-discrimination argu-
ments are bolstered by the complementary claim that the provision of govern-
ment money to religious institutions is necessary to provide consumers of public
services with a full array of choices regarding the provider of those services.
There are both secular and religious implications of this argument. The secular
implication of this argument is the commonplace assertion that private groups
often provide public services more effectively than the government itself.1
0 2
The religious implication of this argument is that there are some people who do
not want to obtain services from a secular government, and that those people
should be allowed to receive their public entitlements within a framework that is
compatible with their religious views. Thus, integrationists argue that the Estab-
lishment Clause is not violated even where the government is providing a state
employee to translate for a student the sectarian components of a religious
school's instruction. The Establishment Clause would be satisfied "even though
[the state employee] would be a mouthpiece for religious instruction, because
the [state program's] neutral eligibility criteria ensured that the interpreter's
99 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 606-07 (1988).
100 Id. at 607.
101 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 n.19 (2000) (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.).
102 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 681 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that religious private schools provide better educational results than public schools, and that gov-
ernment voucher programs that include religious schools "can in fact provide improved education
to underprivileged urban children").
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presence in a sectarian school was a 'result of the private decision of individual
parents' and '[could not] be attributed to state decision-making."" 0 3
The logic of these anti-discrimination claims is quite expansive. The
logic seemingly leads to the conclusion that to avoid discrimination in the provi-
sion of public services to devout religious practitioners, the government must
fund religious institutions providing those services. If the integrationists see any
irony in permitting expansive state financing of religion under a constitutional
provision whose origins can be found in vociferous opposition to state financing
of religion, they blame this result on the expansion of the modem welfare state.
In this century, as the modem administrative state expands to
touch the lives of its citizens in such diverse ways and redirects
their financial choices through programs of its own, it is diffi-
cult to maintain the fiction that requiring government to avoid
all assistance to religion can in fairness be viewed as serving the
goal of neutrality.'04
It would be difficult to overstate the radical implications of the integra-
tionists' attempt to use arguments renouncing discrimination against religion to
justify their sweeping claim that the Constitution may actually require the gov-
ernment to fund religious activity. The integrationists are seeking to do nothing
less than revamp the entire landscape of Establishment Clause doctrine applica-
ble to the public financing of religious institutions.
Integrationists such as Justice Thomas, for example, have long crusaded
to eliminate from Establishment Clause doctrine the concept of the "pervasively
sectarian" institution, which in the separationist era was a term used to describe
religious institutions that were totally barred from receiving government funds
because any funds going to those institutions would inevitably be used for reli-
gious purposes (since by definition religion permeated the entire institution).
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, argues that "the application of the 'perva-
sively sectarian' factor [to bar government aid to pervasively religious institu-
tions] collides with our decisions that have prohibited governments from dis-
criminating in the distribution of public benefits based upon religious status or
sincerity."' 10 5 Leaving aside Justice Thomas's dubious claim that modern oppo-
sition to government aid to pervasively sectarian institutions is nothing more
than a residue of 19th century anti-Catholic animus, 1°6 the implications of aban-
doning this concept are nothing short of revolutionary. If the integrationists
103 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993)).
104 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657-58 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part).
105 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)).
106 Id.
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have their way, then the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses not only
would no longer prohibit the government from financing comprehensively reli-
gious institutions that are engaged in explicitly religious activity; in the new
integrationist constitutional universe, the Religion Clauses would actually re-
quire the government to include pervasively sectarian institutions in any public
benefits program that financed secular aspects of the same type of activity-
regardless of the extent to which government funds are used to finance religious
indoctrination. "If the government is offering assistance to recipients who pro-
vide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the government itself is not
thought responsible for any particular indoctrination."'0 7 One could not envi-
sion a more comprehensive renunciation of the Madisonian "three pence" prin-
ciple.1°8
The ways in which the new Supreme Court majority's integrationist
theory will be applied in the specific sorts of cases noted above are important in
determining the practical implications of the Court's new theory, but these ap-
plications are perhaps equally important in illustrating the radically different
focus of the Court's new Establishment Clause perspective. Under the Court's
traditional separationist perspective, government was prohibited from advancing
particular religious beliefs or symbols, or paying for religious activity, because
to do so would distort the culture in favor of the government's preferred faith.
The rules with regard to specific governmental actions were therefore always
defined with an eye toward the effects those government actions had on reli-
gious dissenters. Thus, in school prayer cases, the Court always rejected the
notion that the government could circumvent the Establishment Clause by draft-
ing a prayer that appealed to virtually all of the students, and excluded only a
few.1°9 In endorsement cases outside the school context, the Court focused on
107 Id. at 809-10.
108 See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS,
reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,63-72 (1947):
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particu-
lar sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other es-
tablishment in all cases whatsoever?
109 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (rejecting the school
board's argument that the Establishment Clause was satisfied by the practice of holding an elec-
tion to determine whether a prayer would be recited at football games: "while Santa Fe's majori-
tarian election might ensure that most of the students are represented, it does nothing to protect the
minority; indeed, it likely serves to intensify their offense."); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594
(1992) ("[T]he embarrassment and the intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by
arguing that these prayers, and similar ones to be said in the future, are of a de minimis character.
... That the intrusion was in the course of promulgating religion that sought to be civic or non-
sectarian rather than pertaining to one sect does not lessen the offense or isolation to the objectors.
At best it narrows their number, at worst increases their sense of isolation and affront.").
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the fear that religious ostracism would mutate into political ostracism."° In the
financing cases, the Court's focus during the separationist era was on two dif-
ferent types of religious dissenters. First, the Court focused on the dissenting
taxpayer, emphasizing that the religious dissenter should not be forced to pay
for the religious exercises of groups with which that taxpayer fundamentally
disagrees.' Second, the Court also focused on religious dissenters more
broadly, on the theory that the already dominant religious factions in society
should not have their dominance reinforced and magnified by the use of gov-
ernment funds."
2
Under the Court's new integrationist theory, the Court's focus has
shifted 180 degrees, turning from the protection of religious dissenters to the
facilitation of the religious majority. The Court's new majority rejects separa-
tionist theory precisely because that theory denies to the religious majority the
ability to infuse their religious beliefs into the government that they control.
The new integrationist model of society envisions religious devotion as the cul-
tural norm and religious dissenters as little more than pesky spoilsports. From
the integrationist point of view, religious dissenters are the Michael Newdows
and Madalyn Murray O'Hairs of the culture," 3 odd creatures attempting to im-
11o See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984):
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.
* . .[Government endorsement of religion] sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community.
"l Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) ("Our history vividly illustrates that one of the
specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption
was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to
support religion in general."); id. at 106 ('The taxpayer's allegation [is] that his tax money is
being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of
legislative power. Such an injury is appropriate for judicial redress ... ").
112 See Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985):
Our cases have recognized that the Establishment Clause guards against
more than direct, state-funded efforts to indoctrinate youngsters in specific re-
ligious beliefs. Government promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a
close identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of any-or
all-religious denominations as when it attempts to inculcate specific reli-
gious doctrines. If this identification conveys a message of government en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment
Clause is violated.
113 Michael Newdow is an atheist who became infamous for challenging the constitutionality of
including the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, which was recited every morning in
the classroom of the public schools that his daughter attended. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). Madalyn Murray O'Hair was the founder of the American Athe-
ists, who became notorious both as a public spokesman for the atheist cause and for bringing high
profile challenges to various alleged Establishment Clause violations. See, e.g., O'Hair v. Andrus,
613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (challenging the use of the National Mall for an outdoor Mass
conducted by the Pope); O'Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979) (challenging the use of
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pose their idiosyncratic, somewhat tiresome, and possibly dangerous viewpoints
on a society overwhelmingly dominated by normal churchgoing folk.
Integrationists view the extraordinary attention paid to religious dissent-
ers under separationist doctrine as having distorted the proper ordering of soci-
ety and devalued the contributions and interests of society's most important
members. As usual, Justice Scalia has articulated this point most forcefully. In
his dissent in Lee v. Weisman-a school prayer case, in which religious coercion
concerns are at their height-Justice Scalia complains that "[t]he reader has
been told much in this case about the personal interest of Mr. Weisman and his
daughter, and very little about the personal interests on the other side. They are
not inconsequential." ' 14 He goes on to describe the larger community's interest
in celebrating its religion "as a people, and not just as individuals"; in other
words (quoting George Washington's first Thanksgiving Proclamation), to cele-
brate God as the "Great Lord and Ruler of Nations." 1 5 As Justice Scalia sums
up his view of the constitutional choice facing the Court:
The issue before us today is not the abstract philosophical ques-
tion whether the alternative of frustrating this desii'e of a reli-
gious majority is to be preferred over the alternative of impos-
ing "psychological coercion," or a feeling of exclusion, upon
nonbelievers. Rather, the question is whether a mandatory
choice in favor of the former has been imposed by the United
States Constitution. As the age-old practices of our people
show, the answer to that question is not at all in doubt. 16
In other words, in the integrationist world religious dissenters lose and
religious majorities win. It is very much a "love it or leave it" message. No one
will be put in jail because they do not adopt the majority's religious faith, and
no one will be fined or otherwise sanctioned because they do not go to church
on Sunday. But at every opportunity the government will be allowed to com-
municate to religious dissenters that their views are outside the mainstream and
strongly disfavored, and that if they want to be full-fledged participants in the
business of governing the country, they better accommodate themselves to what
Scalia calls "the age-old practices of our people."
"in God we trust" as the national motto); O'Hair v. Paine, 432 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1970) (challenging
NASA rule authorizing astronauts to participate in religious ceremonies in space).
114 Lee, 505 U.S. at 645.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 646.
2007]
29
Gey: Life After the Establishment Clause
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2007
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
D. Theme Four: Religious Establishment is a Local, Rather than a Na-
tional Concern
Another consequence of the integrationist's goal of returning control of
the country's religious affairs to the devout majority is the effective devolution
of control over religious issues to local communities and their governments.
This is another inevitable effect of loosening the constraints on religious favorit-
ism by the government generally. If the basic integrationist principle is that the
religious majority should be allowed to exercise its political clout by having the
government endorse its religious views and finance its religious activities, then
there is no logical reason why this theory should not be implemented both at the
local level as well as the state and national levels. After all, it is at the local
level that many of the religious activities emphasized in integrationist opinions
occur-activities such as the recitation of prayer at school and social events, the
placement of religious displays on public property, and the provision of educa-
tional and social services.
To a large extent, this decentralization is already built into Establish-
ment Clause doctrine. This is the clear implication of the ostensibly disparate
holdings in two recent Supreme Court decisions: Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
117
and Locke v. Davey. 18 At first glance there seems to be some tension between
the holdings of these cases because they seem to point in opposite directions
with regard to the rules governing public financing of religious activity. On the
one hand, Zelman holds that the Constitution permits local school authorities to
offer parents publicly financed vouchers to send their children to private reli-
gious schools.' 19 On the other hand, Locke holds that a state may deny scholar-
ships to a university student seeking a devotional theology degree under a
scholarship program that grants state-financed scholarships to all other students
seeking all other types of degrees.120 The seeming inconsistency between these
two holdings is that Zelman seems to interpret the Constitution as requiring state
educational programs to include religious individuals and institutions, whereas
Locke seems to interpret the Constitution as permitting states to intentionally
exclude religious individuals from otherwise all-inclusive public educational
programs.
Despite the fact that these two decisions seem to point in opposite direc-
tions, in fact they are entirely consistent with the fourth theme of the integra-
tionist paradigm. The common factor that reconciles these two holdings is the
Court's implicit determination that the level of government favoritism toward
religion should not be governed by the Constitution at all. Instead of having the
courts serve as umpires between various religious factions fighting for access to
17 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
118 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
119 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 663.
120 Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
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government resources or symbolic favoritism by the government, the integra-
tionist paradigm would simply leave all of these issues to the political process.
Religious factions would therefore have to battle among themselves to deter-
mine where to draw the line between permissible governmental accommodation
of religion and impermissible government favoritism.
This decentralization of church-state disputes amounts to an effective
deconstitutionalization of church-state disputes. In some respects, the decen-
tralization and deconstitutionalization of church-state issues may be the partial
salvation of the separation principle. Many states have substantial populations
of secularists and members of religious groups that are traditionally hostile to
government action advancing religious causes. As a result, many states have
adopted local versions of the separation principle, which are often enshrined in
state constitutions and vigorously enforced by state courts. 21 Because of these
state constitutional anti-establishment provisions, separationists are likely to win
many of these local battles; nevertheless, separationists have no cause to cele-
brate. Because of the need to protect religious liberty nationally in an increas-
ingly diverse culture, the decentralization of church-state disputes is a debacle.
It is a debacle because the harshest effects of the decentralization of church-state
disputes will be visited upon precisely those religious minorities who happen to
live in communities in which religious minorities are least able to defend them-
selves. Local governments in large, diverse urban communities are unlikely to
engage in the aggressive advancement of religion in general or any religious
faction in particular, because religious minorities will have sufficient numbers to
mount an effective opposition campaign in the political process. On the other
hand, local governments in smaller, less diverse rural or suburban communities
will have no such political impediments. Many of these governments will un-
doubtedly engage in precisely the sort of tactless and oppressive favoritism of
locally dominant religious groups that has long been the hallmark of Establish-
ment Clause litigation. The local response to objections from religious dissent-
ers can be expected to reflect sentiments similar to those expressed by a Dun-
canville, Texas assistant school superintendent, who told a parent who objected
to pressure placed on his daughter to pray in local junior high school that
121 See, e.g., Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999), cert de-
nied sub nom., 528 U.S. 1066 (1999) (holding that the Vermont state constitution prohibits the
state from offering tuition reimbursements to parents of children attending religious schools);
Opinion of the Justices (Choice in Educ.), 616 A.2d 478, 480 (N.H. 1992) (citing the New Hamp-
shire state constitution in striking down a state proposal to finance private schools, on the ground
that "[n]o safeguards exist to prevent the application of public funds to sectarian uses"); Witters v.
Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850
(1989) (holding that the Washington state constitution prohibits the application of any public
funds to religious instruction); Bush v. Holmes, 886 So.2d 340 (1st Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), affd
on other grounds, 919 So.2d 392 (Fla. 2006) (striking down a Florida school voucher program
that benefited religious schools, on the ground that it violated the state constitution's "no aid to
religion" clause).
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"unless [the parent] had grandparents buried in the Duncanville Cemetery he
had no right to tell [the assistant superintendent] how to run his schools."'' 22
Similar parochial expressions of local religious dominance are likely to
be the most noticeable immediate effects of adopting the integrationist view of
the Establishment Clause. But as with other aspects of the integrationist theory,
the localization of disputes over religious liberty carries with it broader implica-
tions for constitutional rights generally. If it makes sense to decentralize the
protection of religious liberty, then why not decentralize the protection of other
important constitutional rights as well? The Court has attempted this sort of
thing before, but previously the Court has applied this localized approach only
to areas of relatively low-level constitutional rights. In fact, the nascent effort to
decentralize religious liberty most closely resembles the emphasis on local
community values that has long been part of the modem First Amendment ob-
scenity standard. 23 We are now facing the prospect, therefore, of an increas-
ingly religiously diverse country being governed by a constitutional standard
that is predicated on the assumption that local communities may use their gov-
ernments to perpetuate religious parochialism. The integrationists' stance may
be summarized by paraphrasing a statement Chief Justice Burger once made in
the obscenity context: It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read
the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi re-
spect the legitimacy of religious groups and practices found tolerable in Las
Vegas or New York City.1 24
E. Theme Five: Government is Allowed to Make and Enforce Determina-
tions of Ultimate Value
The final theme of the new integrationist interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause is also an unavoidable logical implication of the first theme. If,
as the first integrationist theme asserts, a proper democratic government should
be allowed to embrace and advance the cause of religion as the cornerstone of
society's civic virtue, then the government should also be authorized to involve
itself in disputes over the ethereal details that are at the heart of religion and
religious disputes. It is very clear that a central integrationist goal is to permit
the government to make assertions on behalf of the entire society about the most
basic religious disputes, such as the existence and nature of a single omnipotent
God. Once the government is permitted to write laws underscoring society's
122 Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 162 n.l (5th Cir. 1993).
123 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (describing the constitutional standard for
obscenity, which includes the consideration of "whether 'the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest" (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
124 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 ("It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of con-
duct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.").
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collective determination that there is a God and that He guides our actions, then
there is little left of Establishment Clause limitations on the government's theo-
logical hubris.
If, to borrow Justice Douglas's unfortunate phrase, "[w]e are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," 125 then presumably our
institutions could also presuppose a series of other fundamental matters that
cannot be proven and may or may not be true. If our institutions can presuppose
a Supreme Being, for example, nothing should prevent those same institutions
from also presupposing that first trimester abortions, 126 the use of contracep-
tion,127 premarital sex,' 2 8 and active homosexuality 129 all represent legally cog-
nizable evils. The morality of these activities is certainly open to debate, but the
ethical assessment of each of these matters embodies a narrower range of con-
testable considerations than the proposition that an all-powerful God runs the
universe. If the Constitution permits the government to answer this more com-
prehensive question, then it should also allow the government to determine the
more discreet matters as well.
The problem with this conception of governmental authority is that it
contradicts our routine assumption that the government should not be deciding
matters of metaphysics, theology, or ultimate truths on behalf of the govern-
ment's own citizens. In our modern conception of the division of authority be-
tween citizens and their government, these sorts of matters are left up to indi-
viduals, not to the political collective. In part this conception arises out of re-
spect for individual differences about the nature of right and wrong and good
and evil, and in part it derives from a hard-won skepticism about the accuracy of
collective determinations of ultimate truths. At least in our popular civic my-
thology, we have moved beyond Holmes's notion that "truth" is simply the "ma-
jority vote of that nation that could lick all others,' 130 and toward a recognition
that "truth," if such a thing exists in a definitive form, will not be discovered and
disseminated through the exercise of raw political power.
125 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
126 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (prohibiting most regulations of first trimester abor-
tions).
127 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (overturning a Massachusetts statute that pro-
hibited unmarried couples from obtaining contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (overturning a Connecticut statute that prohibited married couples from obtaining contra-
ceptives).
128 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (providing a judicial bypass procedure under
which minors may obtain abortions without first seeking parental consent); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (overturning a New York law that prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to minors).
129 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute that
made it a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct).
130 Oliver W. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918).
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The willingness to cede to political majorities the power to make meta-
physical determinations of ultimate values is another illustration of how the in-
tegrationist majority's abandonment of the Court's traditional countermajori-
tarian focus in the Establishment Clause area has implications beyond the relig-
ion cases. As noted above, the Court's new integrationist Establishment Clause
theory is predicated on a very different view of the government's authority over
matters of metaphysics, ideology, and personal morality than has become famil-
iar to readers of the Court's modem First Amendment and privacy decisions.
Consider the range of matters over which the Court has prohibited the govern-
ment from imposing the political majority's values on individuals within society
131 13
who hold different moral views: contraception, juvenile sexual freedom, 32
abortion, 133 possession of sexually explicit expressive materials,' 34 sexually pro-
vocative dancing,' 35 sodomy, 136 homosexuality, 137 and expressive materials ad-
vocating a range of antisocial behaviors.' 38 If the integrationists were to pursue
the logic of their position to its conclusion, they would be forced to overrule
what has become the central proposition of the First Amendment-and probably
the modem Bill of Rights generally-as famously summarized by Justice Jack-
son in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett:139 "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."'
140
The integrationist would trade our modernist skepticism about collec-
tive assertions of truth and value for the comforting Victorian certainties offered
by civic religion and community morality. At least when the cynical Holmes
131 See supra note 127.
132 See supra note 128.
133 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that
states may not enforce regulations that impose an undue burden on the fundamental right to
choose abortion).
134 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the constitutional protections of
free speech and privacy include the right to possess in the home sexually explicit materials-
including materials that are legally obscene).
135 See Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (holding that erotic nude dancing is expressive
conduct that is protected by the First Amendment).
136 See supra note 129.
137 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding unconstitutional a state constitutional
amendment that denied certain legal protections to homosexuals).
138 See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684,
689 (1959) (holding that the constitutional right of free speech "is not confined to the expression
of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that
adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax.").
139 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
140 Id. at 642.
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equated truth and power, he did so to deflate the concept of truth, and thereby
acknowledged the possibility of competing truths. Truth is nothing but a dis-
torted reflection of power relationships, he seemed to say, so don't let claims of
truth fool you; think for yourselves. The integrationists are much more naive
than Holmes, and therefore much more dangerous. When they equate truth and
power (by granting to those who have political power the authority to identify
truth and incorporate those truths into law), the integrationists reveal their belief
that those who have political power possess the ability accurately to recognize
the eternal verities that should guide us all. This is, in contrast to the separation-
ist theory that preceded it, a strikingly immodest conception of government.
The separationist conception of government did not oblige politicians to be
moral visionaries because their role in government was constitutionally limited
to the mundane concerns of the temporal world. The integrationist conception
of government, on the other hand, requires politicians to be moral visionaries
because the government is invited to deliver us from sin. The integrationist
conception will reassure those who admire the moral vision of the political ani-
mals who populate the corridors of government. It will unnerve those of us who
tend to agree with Mark Twain that "[t]he political and commercial morals of
the United States are not merely food for laughter, they are an entire ban-
quet."'
14 1
HII. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE IN THE INTEGRATIONIST ERA
Perhaps the most effective way of illustrating the radical changes envi-
sioned by proponents of the integrationist theory of the Establishment Clause is
to describe how this new theory is likely to be implemented in the day-to-day
world of constitutional litigation. One of the few positive aspects of the demise
of the separationist Establishment Clause is that the new integrationist approach
will clean up the constitutional doctrine that governs relations between church
and state. Commentators and jurists on all sides of the debate about the proper
scope of the Establishment Clause have long agreed that Establishment Clause
doctrine is a chaotic and contradictory mess. The good news is that this doc-
trinal mess will finally get cleaned up. The bad news is that the Court will
probably clean up the doctrine in a way that effectively eliminates any signifi-
cant limit on government aid to religion. Which is, of course, the primary ob-
jective of the integrationist enterprise.
The hopeless disorder of Establishment Clause doctrine is easy to de-
scribe. Before the departures of Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
one or more Justices had embraced no fewer than ten constitutional standards in
enforcing the Establishment Clause. These tests include the notorious Lemon
141 MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN IN ERUPTION 81 (Bernard DeVoto ed., Harper and Brothers
Publishers 1940).
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test, 42 an endorsement analysis, 143 a broad coercion analysis,' 44 a narrow coer-
cion analysis, 145 a formal neutrality standard, 146 a substantive neutrality stan-
dard, 147 a standard that would disincorporate the Establishment Clause from
Fourteenth Amendment (thereby rendering it inapplicable to state and local
governments),' 48 a nonpreferentialist standard, 149 a divisiveness standard,150 and
an ad hoc analysis that would have the Court abandon its efforts to devise a uni-
form standard for church-state cases.' 5' Unfortunately, many of these standards
were deeply inconsistent, a situation made even more untenable by the fact that
142 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted) ("First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1968))).
143 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (modifying the
first two prongs of the Lemon test to inquire "whether government's actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion [and] whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval").
14 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (holding that public schools may be held
accountable for creating situations in which social and peer group pressure is imposed on religious
dissenters).
145 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Establishment Clause
prohibits only "coercion of religious orthodoxy and ... financial support by force of law and
threat of penalty").
146 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (holding that the Establishment
Clause permits the government to funnel money to religious institutions under any program that is
"neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who,
in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice").
147 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (em-
bracing the notion of neutrality, but arguing that the plurality's limited focus on formal neutrality
did not provide the rigorous analysis of government aid to religion that is necessary under the
Establishment Clause).
148 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (arguing that the Establishment Clause should never have been incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment).
149 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Establishment Clause should permit the government to engage in any religious activity so long as
the government does not prefer one specific religious sect over another).
150 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(voting to permit a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas state legislature
based on the observation that "as a practical matter of degree [the Texas] display is unlikely to
prove divisive."); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 725 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In a society as religiously
diverse as ours, the Court has recognized that we must rely on the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment to protect against religious strife, particularly when what is at issue is an area as
central to religious belief as the shaping, through primary education, of the next generation's
minds and spirits.").
151 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the result) (noting that "[w]hile the
Court's prior tests provide useful guideposts... no exact formula can dictate a resolution to such
fact-intensive cases").
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in different opinions some Justices endorsed more than one standard-including
standards that contradicted each other.15 2 Other Justices would endorse a stan-
dard, but then recoil from embracing the logical implications of that standard.
53
As the tenth standard on the list above indicates, still other Justices recoiled
from the basic notion that there should even be an Establishment Clause stan-
dard, resorting instead to an ad hoc approach, deciding specific cases idiosyn-
cratically, in a way that provided little or no guidance for adjudication of future
controversies.
54
Once all is said and done, the Court's new majority is likely to pare
these standards down to two or three of the weakest measures for constitutional
compliance. Some of the current standards certainly will not survive on a Court
dominated by the integrationists. After many years of railing at the resilience of
the Lemon test, 55 integrationists will finally inter it. Likewise, the endorsement
standard, any standard based on true substantive neutrality, and any standard
that focuses on religious divisiveness are also likely to be abandoned by the
Court's new majority. Like Lemon, each of these standards are oriented toward
achieving some level of separation between church and state, and are therefore
incompatible with the new integrationist orientation of the Court.
152 For example, in cases involving religious endorsements in school, Justice Kennedy applies a
very protective (and very separationist) psychological coercion analysis, which holds the govern-
ment accountable for private coercion and social ostracism undertaken in circumstances where
such private behavior is merely facilitated by the government. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
593 (1992) ("The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high
school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students
to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.
This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion."). In cases
involving religious endorsements by the government outside the public school context, on the
other hand, Justice Kennedy applies a much narrower legal coercion standard, which would allow
the government to publicly endorse or embrace religion in any way that falls short of legally co-
ercing religious activity by private citizens. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Our cases
disclose two limiting principles [on government religious endorsements]: government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise
of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it
in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."' (quoting Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 688, 678, (1984))).
153 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 837-38 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (agreeing that neutrality "is an important reason for upholding government-aid programs
against Establishment Clause challenges," but disagreeing with the plurality that an aid program
should be upheld solely because "the aid is offered on a neutral basis and the aid is secular in
content").
154 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the result); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718-19 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
155 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (comparing Lemon to "some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried").
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Of the remaining six standards, five of them share an integrationist ori-
entation, and some combination of these standards could form the basis for the
Court's new approach. More likely, the Court will now focus on three different
standards in the three main areas of Establishment Clause disputes. These three
standards have already become the centerpieces of opinions by the integrationist
Justices who served on the Court during the Rehnquist era. The only difference
is that with the elevation of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, integration-
ists now have an effective majority on the Court and can convert the older inte-
grationist dissents and pluralities into majority opinions.
In cases involving government financing of religious activity, including
government financing of religious schools, the Court's new majority will almost
certainly adopt the formal neutrality analysis that an integrationist majority used
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris to approve all indirect financing to religious insti-
tutions, so long as secular organizations are formally capable of applying for the
funds from the same government program.1 56 As a practical matter, this stan-
dard abolishes any effective limits on indirect government financing of religious
activities. In Zelman itself, for example, virtually all the money in the relevant
government program was funneled to religious organizations. The integrationist
majority dismissed the relevance of the fact that 96% of the government money
was used to aid religious groups, noting offhandedly that "we have recently
found it irrelevant even to the constitutionality of a direct aid program that a
vast majority of program benefits went to religious schools."' 157
In addition to approving virtually all indirect government grants to reli-
gious organizations, the new integrationist majority is also quite likely to ap-
prove direct government aid to religious organizations, even if the government
aid is used to finance explicitly and exclusively religious activities. Four inte-
grationist members of the Court have already stated precisely this conclusion in
their plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms.'58 The basic concept of this opinion
is that once the government has granted aid to a private organization, that or-
ganization's use of the aid is a purely private matter that is not subject to Estab-
lishment Clause restrictions.
So long as the governmental aid is not itself "unsuitable for use
in the public schools because of religious content," and eligibil-
ity for aid is determined in a constitutionally permissible man-
ner [i.e., through a formally neutral framework], any use of that
aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the government and is
thus not of constitutional concern. 159
156 536 U.S. 639, 679-80 (2002).
157 Id. at 658.
158 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
159 Id. at 820 (citations omitted) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392
U.S. 263, 245 (1968)).
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The standard essentially privatizes Establishment Clause violations, which ef-
fectively means that there will be no more Establishment Clause violations.
The Court's new integrationist majority is likely to use an equally lax
standard in non-school endorsement cases. In those cases the Court is likely to
use a standard akin to the narrow coercion analysis that Justice Scalia advocated
in Lee v. Weisman. 6° Ironically, the model of narrow coercion standard can be
found in an opinion that was authored several years earlier by Justice Kennedy,
who turned out to be Justice Scalia's antagonist in Lee. In his opinion in County
of Allegheny v. ACLU,161 Justice Kennedy articulated many of the themes that
would become the heart of the integrationist approach to the Establishment
Clause: the insistence that the Constitution should reflect the fact that the coun-
try is historically religious, 162 the argument that constitutionally mandating a
secular government would express hostility to religion, 63 and the claim that the
Establishment Clause should not be used to separate church and state, but rather
should be directed at preventing egregious violations of religious liberty, such as
the direct governmental coercion of religious participation or the creation of a
state church. 164 This last notion--that only direct coercion of religious partici-
pation should violate the Establishment Clause-is likely to be the primary fo-
cus of the integrationist approach to endorsement cases outside the public
schools. As Justice Kennedy summarized this position in his Allegheny opinion,
"Noncoercive government action within the realm of flexible accommodation or
passive acknowledgment of existing symbols does not violate the Establishment
Clause unless it benefits religion in a way more direct and more substantial than
practices that are accepted in our national heritage."' 65 In other words, the gov-
ernment can erect any and all religious idols, so long as it does not force citizens
to bow down to them. The fact that this action will implicitly communicate to
religious dissenters the message that they are social and political outsiders 66 is
no longer constitutionally relevant.
The third area of frequent Establishment Clause litigation involves ef-
forts to inject religion into public schools. This is the only major area of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence that will remain in flux for the immediate future.
There will be continued uncertainty in this area because Justice Kennedy aban-
dons his integrationist colleagues when it comes to using the public schools to
160 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
162 Id. at 657-58.
163 Id. at 659 (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963)).
164 ld. at 659-60.
165 Id. at 662-63.
166 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
government endorsement of religion is problematic because it "sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying mes-
sage to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community").
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foist religion on school children. Ever since Lee v. Weisman,' 67 in which Justice
Kennedy wrote a strongly separationist majority opinion striking down a non-
sectarian graduation prayer at a public high school, Justice Kennedy has consis-
tently joined the remaining separationists in the school prayer cases. The stan-
dard he would apply in these cases would not merely prohibit the government
from directly endorsing religious activity, but would also prohibit the govern-
ment from doing anything to facilitate religious pressure or coercion by mem-
bers of the religious majority who are not themselves government actors. 168 For
the time being, therefore, one of the most important components of separationist
doctrine will remain, albeit by a slender five to four majority.
This brief rendering of the doctrinal changes in store in Establishment
Clause cases should not be dismissed lightly. For many constitutional scholars
and academics, a discussion of the constitutional standards applicable to Estab-
lishment Clause cases is far less important than discussions of a Grand Theory
of church and state. To sophisticated academics, attempting to fit the deeper
constitutional issues and principles into a formal (and formalistic) standard or
test emits the down-market odor of black-letter law. And indeed, once a case
reaches the Supreme Court, these tests and standards often get ignored by the
Justices themselves, who often use the particular cases that come before them as
vehicles in ongoing battles among themselves about larger philosophical and
structural issues. But lower court judges, school board attorneys, and other gov-
ernment officials take very seriously the standards articulated by the Supreme
Court to communicate in concrete form abstract constitutional theories. These
standards structure official decisions on matters of church and state, and when
these decisions get challenged in court, the same standards structure the attor-
neys' attacks on a government action. So the Supreme Court's adoption of one
standard and the abandonment of another is not merely an academic exercise.
Like the separation principle itself, the Court's persistent use of separa-
tionist language in its constitutional doctrine has significantly limited the extent
to which lower courts and government officials could ignore the general thrust
of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions. Some of the Court's
standards have been quite rigorous, despite the fact that the Court itself has of-
ten honored those standards in the breach (much as it has the separation princi-
ple itself). The prime example of the rigorously worded standard is the much-
maligned Lemon test. The Lemon test requires that "[f]irst, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, . . . finally, the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.""A69 If applied
faithfully, the Lemon factors are quite exacting, and the lower courts often took
these factors very seriously. Although academic critics of Lemon often tended
167 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
168 See supra note 152.
169 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted).
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to disparage the notion that courts could ever effectively prevent the government
from adopting religiously motivated legislation, 70 in fact the lower courts have
frequently and effectively proscribed surreptitiously sectarian government ac-
tions, especially in the schools. ff evidence exists that a particular policy was
adopted for religious motives-and such evidence is often not hard to find-
then courts are quite willing to strike down that policy and award substantial
attorneys' fees to the successful plaintiffs who challenged the policy. 17 1 A pat-
tern of successes in a few high-profile cases such as these effectively communi-
cates the message to government agencies that religion is off-limits, and com-
municates the even more effective message that if the government agencies in-
tend to circumvent the constitutional rules in the future, they may find them-
selves writing the ACLU a hefty check.
In contrast to the clear warnings against religious favoritism communi-
cated to government officials during the separationist era, the message sent by
the standards likely to be adopted by the new integrationist majority in the Su-
preme Court will be quite different. The new standards will tend to send the
message to government officials, agencies, and school boards that they can get
away with pretty much any level of religious favoritism, so long as they engage
in a few formal measures to cover their tracks. This result should not be surpris-
ing, since Court's new integrationist majority has adopted standards that seem to
have been designed to offer the government mechanisms to convey plausible
deniability that religious establishment has occurred, rather than to provide a
truly rigorous constitutional framework to limit the government from intruding
into the religious lives of its citizens.
170 For example, in Michael Perry's earlier work he acknowledged that the nonestablishment
norm prohibited the government from relying on religious reasons for legislation, but conceded
that this norm would be "underenforced" because the courts often would be unable to determine
whether the norm had been violated. "If government based a political choice about the morality
of human conduct at least partly on a plausible secular supporting argument, it would be ex-
tremely difficult for a court to discern whether government based the choice solely on the secular
argument or, instead, partly on the secular argument and partly on the religious argument." Mi-
chael J. Perry, Religion in Politics, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 736-37 (1996).
171 The most prominent recent example of this phenomenon is Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School
Dist., 400 F.Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005), in which a District Court struck down a local school
board's policy of introducing religiously-based "Intelligent Design" materials to challenge the
scientific theory of evolution. After a month-long trial, the court determined that the policy of
challenging evolution was motivated by religious purpose, and the court sharply chided the school
board officials who were responsible for the policy: 'The citizens of the Dover area were poorly
served by the members of the Board who voted for the [Intelligent Design] Policy. It is ironic that
several of these individuals, who so staunchly and proudly touted their religious convictions in
public, would time and again lie to cover their tracks and disguise the real purpose behind the
[Intelligent Design] Policy." Id. at 765. The attorneys for the plaintiffs in the Dover case were
awarded more than $2 million in attorney's fees, although they ultimately agreed to accept less
than half that amount. Christina Kauffman, Dover Gets Million-Dollar Bill, YORK DISPATCH, Feb.
22, 2006, available at http://www.yorkdispatch.com/local/ci_3535139.
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IV. THE INEVITABLE FAILURE OF THE INTEGRATIONIST ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE PARADIGM
The title of this section may be somewhat overstated; it is at least possi-
ble that the Court's new majority will succeed in recasting the Establishment
Clause in the form of the integrationist paradigm. It is at least possible, in other
words, that the country could embrace the fractiously religious new political
culture described by Justice Scalia and his integrationist colleagues. If so, then
citizens would have to accept certain fundamental changes in the nature of the
American political system. Under the new regime, members of the religious
majority could wield their political power to transform the culture by advancing
their own religious views as central to the nation's political ethos. Although
members of the religious majority can be expected to take this new system to
heart, the adoption of this approach will require the exercise of a certain reli-
gious and ideological hubris on their part. Adopting this system will require the
religious majority to take the leap of faith that religious demographics during
the next two centuries are going to continue to favor the same sects that have
dominated the nation's political culture during the first two hundred years.
Given the demographic changes described below, adopting this system may be a
major gamble. Nevertheless, the country could decide to go this route. The
purpose of this section, however, is to suggest that there are several reasons to
believe that the integrationist attempt to fundamentally revamp Establishment
Clause jurisprudence will not succeed. There are several reasons to suggest that
the principle of separation of church and state is deeply ingrained into the spirit
of the country in ways that the Court's new integrationist majority will have
great difficulty overcoming. Four reasons, in particular, present major obstacles
to the long-term success of the integrationist paradigm.
The first reason that the integration of church and state is likely to fail is
that the integrationist approach is deeply inconsistent with the country's basic
history and traditions. The integrationists have been very adept recently at as-
serting the contrary. As noted above, proponents of the integrationist para-
digm defend their position in large part by reference to the country's religious
history. Specifically, integrationist Justices recite a familiar list of instances in
which the government has endorsed religion or agreed to finance religious en-
terprises; 173 integrationist academic treatises defend the integrationist position
by arguing that the Framers never intended the Establishment Clause to prevent
the government from favoring religion generally,1 74 or by arguing that the prin-
ciple of separation of church and state was largely a theoretical ploy devised by
political forces that were not interested in advancing the cause of individual
172 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
173 Id.
174 See, e.g., MICHAEL MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978); ROBERT CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL
FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982).
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religious liberty, but rather were either anti-religious or anti-Catholic; 75 and
conservative politicians contribute to the popular perception of the country's
integrationist past by simply asserting as a matter of historical fact that this
country is a "Christian nation."'
' 76
There are two main problems with these historical claims. The first
problem is that these claims ignore, inaccurately downplay, or misconstrue the
long history of separationist sentiment that stretches back to the founding of the
country and beyond. This country's separationist history is rich and diverse. It
includes a range of examples, including Roger Williams and the separationist
state of Rhode Island; 177 Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,178 which led
the state of Virginia's to adopt Jefferson's Bill for Religious Freedom; 79 the
broad popular antagonism to state financing of religious education in New York
City in the early nineteenth century; 180 the adoption of so-called "Little Blaine"
amendments by states throughout the country during the late nineteenth cen-
tury-many of which cannot be explained away as artifacts of anti-
Catholicism;'18 and the growth of separationist sentiment in the twentieth cen-
tury, as evidenced by the Court's Everson opinion 182 and the extensive separa-
tionist Establishment Clause jurisprudence that developed subsequent to Ever-
son.183 This is not to say that separationist sentiment has always dominated the
country's attitudes toward church-state relations, but it is clear that the principle
of separation of church and state has roots just as deep in the country's history
as the notion that this is a pervasively religious, monotheistic, or Christian na-
tion.
175 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
176 In one notorious example, at a news conference concluding the 1992 Republican Governors
Association meeting, Governor Kirk Fordice of Mississippi asserted that "The United States of
America is a Christian nation, which does not in any way infer at any time that religious intoler-
ance or any kind of particular dogma is being forced on anyone else. It just is a simple fact of life
in the United States of America." Richard L. Berke, With a Crackle, Religion Enters G.O.P.
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at A23. He went on to argue that "the less we emphasize the
Christian religion the further we fall into the abyss of poor character and chaos in the United
States of America." Id.
177 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE (1967) (discuss-
ing Williams' separationism and the founding of the state of Rhode Island-the state with the
deepest strain of separationist sentiment in the young nation).
178 See supra note 32.
179 See supra note 33.
180 See WILLIAM OLAND BOURNE, HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SOCIETY OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK (1870) (discussing the opposition to publicly funded religious education in New York
City during the early 19th century); JOHN WEBB PRATT, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE
CHURCH-STATE THEME IN NEW YORK HISTORY (1967) (same).
181 See, e.g., Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999) (noting the absence of evi-
dence linking the Arizona state constitutional disestablishment provision to the anti-Catholic
bigotry that motivated the national Blaine Amendment).
182 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
183 See Section I supra.
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When faced with two equally strong and mutually inconsistent tradi-
tions, it is impossible to rely on history alone to definitively settle current dis-
putes about which tradition we should embrace as "our" tradition. In fact, both
integrationist and separationist approaches to the Establishment Clause have
deep roots in the nation's history. Deciding which tradition we should select to
guide current Establishment Clause analysis requires us to answer the more sub-
tle query of which tradition makes the most sense in light of the evolution of our
constitutional landscape, modem social conditions, and a reasonable under-
standing of each tradition's contemporary implications. When approached from
this perspective, the second problem with the integrationist perspective becomes
evident: The second problem with the integrationists' historical claims is that
they sanitize the nature of the country's integrationist past. It is certainly true
that there are many instances in this country's history in which the religious
majority has used the government for its own ends. But contrary to the benign
description of those historical instances by proponents of the integrationist para-
digm, a large number of these episodes represent modem-day embarrassments.
It is impossible to take pride in famous examples of governmental religious fa-
voritism such as John Jay's proposal that Catholics be excluded from New
York; 184 the requirements imposed by many states early in the country's history
that those holding state office must express belief in Protestant Christianity;'85
Protestant efforts during the nineteenth century to use the public school system
to proselytize Catholics and other non-Protestants; 86 Justice Story's blunt asser-
tion that the First Amendment was not intended "to countenance, much less to
advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity;
but to exclude all rivalry among christian sects;' ' 87 or the violent hostility ex-
pressed during the early twentieth century toward Jehovah's Witnesses who
refused to salute the flag. 88 It is equally difficult to find much to be proud of in
the sorts of modem examples of government "acknowledgment" of religion that
Justice Scalia so vigorously defends. A culture that would force a young girl to
miss her own high school graduation to avoid participating in prayer, 89 or
which requires a court to enjoin school officials to prevent them from harassing,
intimidating, or trying to identify students who had sued anonymously to pre-
194 See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 162 (1986).
185 See MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS (1984) (describing the various legal
restrictions on Jews and other non-Christians during the country's early history).
186 See 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 830-35 (1950).
187 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 594 (1851).
188 See Victor W. Rotnem & F. G. Folsom, Jr., Recent Restrictions Upon Religious Liberty, 36
AM. POL. SC. REV. 1053, 1062 (1942) (describing "an uninterrupted record of violence and perse-
cution of the Witnesses" in the wake of Supreme Court decisions regarding the flag salute and
noting that "[ailmost without exception, the flag and the flag salute can be found as the percussion
cap that sets off these acts").
189 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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vent the school from violating the Establishment Clause, 90 is not a culture that
respects religious liberty. In short, the dynamic of history does not favor mov-
ing away from separationism and toward a renewed integration of church and
state. Even if there is evidence that the country has engaged in integrationist
behavior in its past, to modem eyes this behavior often appears downright un-
American.
The second reason the integrationists will have trouble convincing the
country to embrace the integrationist paradigm of the Establishment Clause is
that the religious demographics of the United States is rapidly changing. For a
growing portion of the country's population, integrating church and state is di-
rectly contrary to both their own views on religion and their individual self-
interest. Recall Justice Scalia's recent effort to muster statistical support for his
claim that virtually the entire country supports the symbolic integration of
church and state. 191 Recall that according to Justice Scalia, 97.7% of the coun-
try is monotheistic, which Justice Scalia interprets as meaning that 97.7% of the
country would support efforts by the government to symbolically endorse a
monotheistic notion of the Almighty. 92 As noted above,' 93 this calculation not
only expressly omits Hindus, Buddhists and what Justice Scalia calls other "be-
lievers in unconcerned deities," but also blithely ignores adherents of monothe-
istic sects that are opposed to church-state integration and, most importantly, all
varieties of secularists.
The reason the latter omission is so important is because secularists are
the fastest growing component of the American religious demographic. As the
authors of the American Religious Identification Survey noted in their most
recent edition, one of the major changes between their 1990 and 2001 surveys
was that
the greatest increase in absolute as well as percentage terms has
been among those adults who do not subscribe to any religious
identification; their number has more than doubled from 14.3
million in 1990 to 29.4 million in 2001; their proportion has
grown from just eight percent of the total in 1990 to over four-
teen percent in 2001.194
190 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 n.l (2000) (quoting order issued
by the district court noting that school officials and others seeking "overtly or covertly to ferret
out the identities of the Plaintiffs in this cause. . . WILL FACE THE HARSHEST POSSIBLE
CONTEMPT SANCTIONS FROM THIS COURT, AND MAY ADDITIONALLY FACE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY") (emphasis in original).
191 See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 BARRY A. KOSMIN, EGON MAYER, & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION
SURVEY 2001, at 10-11 (2001).
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Members of another growing portion of the population simply refuse to
answer questions about their religious preferences. This group grew from two
percent of the population in 1990 (4 million people) to five percent of the popu-
lation in 2001 (11 million people).195 During the same period, "the proportion
of the population that can be classified as Christian has declined from eighty-six
[percent] in 1990 to seventy-seven percent in 2001. ' 'I96 Members of non-
Christian religious groups grew from 5.8 million to 7.7 million-from 3.3 per-
cent to 3.7 percent.
97
The lesson to be drawn from these figures is that the United States is
rapidly becoming both less religious and less Christian. This reality undermines
Justice Scalia's basic claim that the country is almost unanimously in favor of
the integration of church and state. If the situation were as Justice Scalia inac-
curately described it, with almost 97.7% of the population in agreement on these
matters, it might be politically realistic to adopt the integrationist paradigm. In
Justice Scalia's nation, the religious majority would be happy to express their
religious views through the government that they dominated, and the religious
minority would be so small that they could do nothing about the matter. But
that is not the nation we live in. In the real nation, roughly ten to twenty percent
of the population is altogether nonreligious, and another substantial portion of
the population either belongs to non-Christian sects, or to Christian sects that
disagree with integrationist paradigm. In the real nation, therefore, the project
of integrating church and state becomes immensely more politically problematic
than in Justice Scalia's homogeneous land. Perhaps simply as a matter of per-
sonal survival 2.3% of the population might sit still for having the government
constantly tout the religious views of the other 97.7% of the population; it is
much more unlikely that twenty, thirty, or forty percent of the population will be
equally supine.
The third reason the integrationists may encounter strong opposition to
their view of the Establishment Clause is related to the second reason. Just as
the country's religious demographics as a whole are rapidly changing, we can
reasonably expect local demographics to follow this trend. Thus, while there
may have been substantial grassroots support for the integration of church and
state when many citizens lived in relatively isolated and religiously homogene-
ous areas of the country, those isolated pockets of religious homogeneity are
shrinking as the country becomes more cosmopolitan and interconnected.
There are no good surveys of religious demography in the United States
that are broken down by county. But one can infer from two basic facts that
religious diversity is increasing throughout the country. The first basic fact is
that the United States is characterized by an extraordinarily high level of geo-
graphic mobility. United States citizens exhibit almost twice the level of re-
195 Id. at 11.
196 Id. at 10.
197 Id.
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gional mobility as compared to citizens of the European Union, for example. 98
According to the 2000 census, only sixty percent of United States residents re-
side in the state in which they were born. 199 Mobility is a fact of life in the
modem United States, and increased mobility is likely to be accompanied by the
increased religious diversification of areas were previously isolated and demog-
raphically uniform.
The second basic fact is that comprehensive surveys of religious de-
mography that are broken down by state show substantial populations of secu-
larists and religious minorities even in the most religiously homogeneous states.
In all but eight states, the percentage of people who classify themselves as hav-
ing "no religion" is in the double digits. 2°° In four states, none of which are
located in the highly urbanized (and presumptively highly secular) industrial
northeast, "no religion" is now the largest "denomination., 20' Even states that
are usually thought of as bastions of traditional religious faith have substantial
secular populations. The second largest "denomination" in Utah, for example,
is "no religion. 20 2
The point here is not that sectarian domination of particular areas of the
country is no longer a problem; indeed, many states continue to be dominated
by a single Christian sect.20 3 The point, rather, is that even where a single sect
dominates a state or locality, members of that dominant sect can no longer count
on having only a small handful of opponents when they seek to exercise their
political power by infusing the government with their religious views. Even
outside the major urban centers, majoritarian religious establishments are likely
to encounter serious opposition almost everywhere. Douglas Laycock once
described the young United States as "overwhelmingly Protestant and hostile to
other faiths.,, 204 The integrationists' dilemma is that the modem United States is
much less Protestant than in the past and members of the other faiths are now
numerous enough to return the religious majority's hostility in kind.
The fourth reason why the integrationist paradigm is unlikely to succeed
is the radical and essentially unlimited nature of the power the new paradigm
198 EUROPEAN FOUND. FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS, MOBILITY
IN EUROPE 14 (Tom Vandenbrande, ed., 2006), available at http://www.eurofound
.europa.edu/pubdocs/2006/59/en/1/ef0659en.pdf.
199 U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Table P22: Place of Birth and Residence in 1995:2000, at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTrable?_bm=y&-geoid= 01000US&-qr name=DEC_2000_
SF3_UQTP22&-ds-name=DEC_2000_SF3_U (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
200 Kosmin, et al, supra note 194, at 39-42, Exhibit 15.
201 Id. (the states are Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming).
202 Id.
203 Fifteen states have 35 percent or more of their populations identifying with one sect and
have no other sect reporting identification rates within twenty percentage points of the dominant
sect. Id.
204 Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim about Original Intent,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875,918 (1986).
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would assign to the government. The integrationist paradigm effectively would
abolish any structural limitation on the government's ability to act on religious
grounds or favor religious institutions and principles. Individual religious dis-
senters would retain protections from direct government coercion under the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, but under an integrationist Establishment
Clause dissenters would no longer be able to prevent members of the religious
majority from using the government to symbolically and financially reinforce
their spiritual hegemony.
Justice Scalia has tried to put a benign face on this pious new govern-
ment by suggesting that there are still limits on how far down the road to theoc-
racy the new government could go. He has suggested, for example, that the
government still should not officially specify the "details upon which men and
women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world
are known to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ). '20 5  This concession
perhaps explains his strained attempt to focus on monotheism rather than Chris-
tianity as the permissible form of American religious establishment. 2' The
problem with these attempts to assuage the fears of those who remain uncom-
fortable with the possibility of theocratic government, however, is that they are
logically inconsistent with the arguments proffered by integrationists to explain
their opposition to the separation of church and state.
Integrationists defend their new paradigm on the grounds that it reflects
the religious history of the country better than separationism, and it provides a
moral foundation for government that is absent from competing models of gov-
ernment that are defined by the principles of secular liberalism. 2°7 But if these
arguments are valid, they lead to the conclusion that the government should be
allowed to advance real religion, not the sort of friendly, empty "religion lite"
described by Justice Scalia. To the extent that the country's history supports the
integration of church and state, that history does not support the government's
endorsement of an insipid and featureless monotheism; rather, that unfortunate
history supports the government's endorsement of a robust brand of Protestant
Christianity. If we decide to focus on the country's integrationist history, then
Justice Story describes that history more accurately than Justice Scalia.2°8
Likewise, if the integrationist arguments about the emptiness of secular
liberalism are valid, then this argument also supports the introduction of strong,
definitive religious principles into government-precisely the sorts of principles
"upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator
and Ruler of the world are known to differ. '' 209 Forcing the government to dilute
religion into a bland, lowest-common-denominator ecumenism will contribute
205 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206 See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
209 Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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nothing of value to society's civic virtue and will do little to provide govern-
ment with the strong, substantive moral grounding that integrationists argue a
limited, secular government cannot supply. The integrationists cannot have it
both ways; they cannot simultaneously argue on the one hand that religion prin-
ciples supply an essential and highly substantive element of good government,
and on the other hand that these principles are so benign and uncontroversial
that they would offend only a small handful of inveterate cranks.
In truth, the integrationists cannot acknowledge the broad implications
of their theory because to do so would reveal the radically undemocratic nature
of church-state integration. Theories of church-state integration all rest on the
unspoken premise that the celestial claims of religion are superior to the tempo-
ral concerns of mere mortals. The integrationist view of the relationship be-
tween church and state ultimately depends on the assumption of celestial domi-
nance once expressed by Michael McConnell in the context of a Free Exercise
Clause discussion:
[R]eligious claims-if true-are prior to and of greater dignity
than the claims of the state. If there is a God, His authority nec-
essarily transcends the authority of nations; that, in part, is what
we mean by "God." For the state to maintain that its authority
is in all matters supreme would be to deny the possibility that a
transcendent authority could exist.
210
The problem for integrationists is that many Americans would be un-
comfortable ceding to a group of politicians the responsibility of receiving from
God particular instructions for how to live our lives on earth. So integrationists
have a dilemma: Their first choice is to dilute the religious principles that the
government is allowed to endorse, thereby robbing their theory of its central
purpose of morally grounding the government. Alternatively, they could admit
that under an integrationist regime the government would be permitted to ad-
vance through law the transcendent claims of a celestial authority that many
citizens do not recognize, which is likely to remind those same citizens why
Madison's version of the Establishment Clause seemed so compelling in the
first place. Either way, the integrationist paradigm is doomed to fail.
CONCLUSION
If the assumptions outlined here about the new majority of the Roberts
Court are correct, we are about to witness a paradigm shift in the way the Su-
preme Court approaches the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. On
the other hand, if I have correctly assessed the country's changing religious de-
mography, social evolution, and shifting American attitudes toward religious
liberty, this paradigm shift toward church-state integration will not take root.
210 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 15 (1985).
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We have been down this road before, in fact, several times. And every time
particular religious factions have attempted to advance their own cause by cir-
cumventing our traditional national antipathy toward the joinder of church and
state, the attempts have undermined religious liberty, increased the country's
political divisions along religious lines, and even led to sectarian violence. For-
tunately for us all, the ultimate consequence of each episode has been a recom-
mitment to the Madisonian vision of a secular government, coupled with a vig-
orous protection of private conscience and freely chosen religious faith. Per-
haps separationists should take heart, therefore, despite their dwindling numbers
on the Supreme Court. If our own history is any indication, it seems that noth-
ing can rekindle the nation's separationist resolve like a brief flirtation with the
Bosnian alternative.
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